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Foreword 
 
This research was conducted by a team of legal researchers between May and July 2015. We 
are grateful for the support and funding from the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature Environmental Law Centre (IUCN ELC) and in particular the helpful guidance of 
Professor Paul Martin from the University of New England and Lydia Slobodian from the 
IUCN ELC. There is no doubt a great deal more work to do in refining methods for 
evaluating environmental laws, but it is a challenge that lawyers, scientists, scholars and 
policy-makers must embrace. This research project was exploratory, investigative and small 
scale and its conclusions and recommendations ought to be read in that light. 
Evaluation team  
 
Evan HAMMAN (Project Lead) PhD Candidate/Sessional Academic, QUT Law 
Katie WOOLASTON Sessional Academic, QUT Law  
Rana KOROGLU Senior Solicitor, Environmental Defenders Office, NSW 
Hope JOHNSON PhD Candidate/Sessional academic, QUT  Law 
Bridget LEWIS Lecturer, QUT Law 
 
Summary of evaluation 
 
This report provides an evaluation of the implementation of the Polluter Pays Principle (PPP) 
– a principle of international environmental law – in the context of pollution from sugarcane 
farming affecting Australia’s Great Barrier Reef (GBR). The research was part of an 
experiment to test methods for evaluating the effectiveness of environmental laws. Overall, 
we found that whilst the PPP is reflected to a limited extent in Australian law (more so in 
Queensland law, than at the national level), the behaviour one might expect in terms of 
implementing the principle was largely inadequate. Evidence of a longer term, explicit 
commitment to the PPP was particularly weak.  
 
Despite the introduction (in 2009) of strict regulatory controls for sugarcane farmers to reduce 
their run-off, governments have instead encouraged industry-led voluntary programs to 
transition towards more sustainable farming practices. These initiatives have not been taken 
up by every farmer and the ones that have not adopted it have not been penalised.
1
 Where 
voluntary measures have been adopted, the costs appear to be heavily subsidised by 
government although there is some evidence that farmers have been contributing.
2
 That said, 
a recent Queensland Audit Office report noted that ‘more specific, direct incentives to give the 
                                                        
1 Evidence suggests there has been ‘a low level’ of adoption of the voluntary schemes. See Queensland Audit 
Office, Report 20, 2014-15 <available at www.qao.qld.gov.au> 3. 
2 WWF, ‘Saving the Nature World, Freshwater Pollution of the Great Barrier Reef’ 
<http://www.wwf.org.au/our_work/saving_the_natural_world/oceans_and_marine/priority_ocean_places/great_ba
rrier_reef/threats/freshwater_pollution/> accessed 31 July 2015. 
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voluntary programs the best chance of success are missing.’3 A significant portion of the costs 
of pollution, therefore, continue to be borne by the public sector. In theory, public expenditure 
of this nature fails a strict interpretation of the PPP which requires a full internalisation of 
pollution costs by industry.
4
 However, in our view, the combination of voluntary measures 
and emerging evidence of industry-led research indicates at least a partial implementation of 
the PPP. 
 
The precise degree of implementation is uncertain. Our conclusions might be validated by 
further research, for instance, by calculating the economic costs of sugarcane pollution 
affecting the GBR and analysing what proportion of these costs are being borne by individual 
farmers and by the industry as a whole. A stricter interpretation of the PPP (stricter than the 
one we adopted) would probably require a nominal amount of public money to support a 
move towards sustainable land uses where all growers eventually internalise the full costs of 
their pollution. The PPP does appear to allow for these types of reasonable ‘transitional’ 
arrangements. That is to say, some form of government support is not inconsistent with a 
proper implementation of the principle provided it is appropriately targeted.
5
 In any event, 
farmers would only be expected to internalise the proportion of pollution costs they are 
responsible for, as the principle of proportionality must also be taken into account.
6
 Herein 
lies a particular challenge for Australian policy-makers as pollution from cattle and banana 
farming are also having significant impacts on GBR water quality and separating out the costs 
of those impacts might be tricky.
7
  
What evidence was used to support our conclusions? 
We looked at various forms of evidence which we pre-determined to have some level of 
objectivity. Each level of analysis involved either primary (e.g. laws, policies, cases and 
conventions) or secondary sources (commentary and academic discourse) or a combination of 
both. With the secondary sources we were careful to select mostly peer- reviewed 
publications from reputable journals or texts which were considered authoritative. Primary 
sources, such as primary scientific data about agricultural pollution and legal decisions and 
laws concerning the PPP were assumed to be ‘objective’ although we readily acknowledge 
there are those that argue they might not be. Some limited material from Government, non-
government organisations (NGOs) and industry websites were also used as evidence for those 
stakeholders’ activities. An original plan to undertake semi-structured interviews was 
abandoned due to time and resource constraints.  
What method was used to evaluate the effectiveness of the principle? 
The method for our research was qualitative in nature and focussed on a case study of the 
implementation of the PPP with regards to pollution of the GBR from sugarcane farming. 
Pollution of the GBR from sugarcane farming is understood to be sourced mainly from three 
                                                        
3 Queensland Audit Office, Report 20, 2014-15 <available at www.qao.qld.gov.au> 4. 
4 Sally A Joseph, ‘The Polluter Pays Principle and land remediation: a comparison of the United Kingdom and 
Australian Approaches’ (2014) 1 AJEL 24. 
5 Sally A Joseph, ‘The Polluter Pays Principle and land remediation: a comparison of the United Kingdom and 
Australian Approaches’ (2014) 1 AJEL 24.  
6 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Environment, Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte H.A 
Standley and Others (1999) Case C-293/97.  
7 Methods for measuring the economic value of the environment are improving. For a recent discussion see The 
Hon Justice Brian J Preston, ‘Economic Valuation of the Environment’ (2015) 32 Environment and Planning Law 
Journal 301. 
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main catchments along the Queensland coast
8
 and comprises increased sediment, herbicides 
and nutrients (e.g. nitrogen). After selection of the case study, our method involved five 
distinct stages of analysis: 
 
1. Implementation of the PPP into the relevant law;  
2. Implementation of the PPP into relevant ‘governance’ processes;  
3. Evidence of behavioural change by key stakeholders; 
4. Evidence of outcomes of implementation of the PPP; and 
5. Conclusions and further research.  
 
At each stage, a documentary analysis was completed looking at publicly available 
material (reports, plans, maps, articles etc.) from a variety of stakeholders such as 
Australian and Queensland Governments, the scientific community, NGOs and the 
sugarcane industry.  
What assumptions underpinned our research? 
Our assumptions were largely informed by our own discipline (law) and our individual 
experiences in working with environmental laws to date:  
 
1. Legal principles, although often drafted in deliberately broad terms, are capable of 
being defined and evaluated to some extent. 
2. Legal principles are, by their very nature, quite distinct from laws. Principles may 
inform laws, or approaches to governance more generally, but they may or may not 
be expressly adopted in the law.
9
 
3. It may often be the case that a single legal principle is not capable of delivering 
effective environmental outcomes on its own. A legal principle, like the PPP or the 
Precautionary Principle will often require adequate support from complimentary 
principles (for example, the principle of Access to Information and Public 
Participation) not to mention broader institutional or legal reform. We have therefore 
assumed in this research that other complimentary principles are effectively being 
implemented in order to support the operation of the PPP, though of course, it may be 
the case that they are not. 
4. Effectiveness, in terms of outcome may not require one hundred percent ‘righting’ of 
‘wrongs.’ Given the difficulty with quantifying acceptable standards in environmental 
law (take for instance, the difficulty involved with determining what constitutes a 
                                                        
8 M Smith, M J Poggio, M Thompson, and A Collier, ‘The Economics of Pesticide Management Practices on 
Sugarcane Farms: Final Synthesis Report. Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF), Queensland.’ 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) Queensland, Brisbane (2014). 
<http://era.daf.qld.gov.au/4492/1/fin-synth-rep-econ-pest-mgment-sc-farms.pdf> accessed 31 July 2015. 
9 Even if they are not expressly provided in the law, the ‘spirit’ of the principle may nevertheless be present and 
we have assumed that the principle is therefore still ‘present’ in some form. Where a principle is totally absent 
from the law, however, it may still nevertheless be effective in delivering environmental outcomes. Our previous 
attempt at evaluating environmental principles found this: A decision to cull White Sharks in Western Australia 
was ultimately stopped on the basis of the precautionary principle. However, this was not because the principle 
was required to be applied by law. Rather, the culture of decision making within the organisation ensured the 
principle was effectively employed to achieve an environmental outcome. See Katie Woolaston and Evan 
Hamman, ‘The operation of the precautionary principle in Australian environmental law: An examination of the 
Western Australian White Shark drum line program.’ (2015) 32 Environment and Planning Law Journal 327.  
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healthy environment and whether there is a human right to such
10
), we have assumed 
that it will be sufficient for a legal principle like the PPP to be effective if it 
contributes, in some meaningful way, to positive environmental outcomes. 
5. Lastly, the responsibility for the implementation of principles does not reside solely 
with State actors. It is necessary to also consider the actions and influences of non-
state actors, including non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and private industry.  
What has been learned about objective evaluation of legal principles? 
Firstly, the outcome of any evaluation is likely to be influenced by the chosen method, and in 
our case, the scope of the case study. Initially, we chose to investigate the PPP in respect of 
the impacts of all agricultural pollution affecting the GBR. However, we soon realised such a 
case study was too broad given the multitude of institutions, laws, policies and scientific 
literature involved. We therefore decided to narrow the research to focus on pollution from 
sugarcane farming in the three priority catchments which are responsible for 85% of 
Queensland’s sugar production.11 Narrowing the case study allowed for richer and more 
insightful results and more efficient allocation of team time and resources.  
 
Secondly, the particular interpretation of the legal principle that the researcher adopts is likely 
to significantly influence their conclusions. For example, the PPP, a principle which at first 
glance seems relatively straightforward to apply, actually has multiple dimensions, some of 
which are mutually exclusive and others of which are complementary.
12
 Moreover, some 
researchers suggested that partial internalisation of costs by polluters (the rest payable by the 
state) may be consistent with an effective implementation of the principle,
13
 whilst others 
suggested a full internalisation is how the PPP should operate. There is thus no unanimous 
agreement on what the PPP actually entails, or indeed what it should look like in practice.
14
 
Others who have attempted an evaluation of the PPP have reported similar issues with 
ambiguity, suggesting that the principle was never intended to be a ‘precise legal term.’15 The 
inherent impreciseness of the PPP invites subjective consideration of its elements and 
therefore throws into question the ‘objective’ credibility of the rest of the method and any 
results. That said, the vagueness of a legal principle ‘should not [necessarily] lead us to 
condemn it’ as there is an increasingly important role for legal scholarship (and trialling 
methods such as this) ‘to progressively decipher new case law developments with the aim of 
                                                        
10 Dinah Shelton, ‘Human rights, environmental rights, and the right to environment’ (1991-1992) 28 SJIL 103; 
Prudence E Taylor, ‘From Environmental to Ecological Human Rights: A New Dynamic in International Law?’ 
(1998) 10 GIELR 309; Barry E Hill, Steve Wolfson, and Nicholas Targ, 'Human Rights and the Environment: A 
Synopsis and Some Predictions' (2004) 16(3) GIELR 359. 
11 These areas are the Wet Tropics, Burdekin Dry Tropics and Mackay Whitsunday regions.  See M Smith, M J 
Poggio, M Thompson, and A Collier, ‘The Economics of Pesticide Management Practices on Sugarcane Farms: 
Final Synthesis Report. Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF), Queensland.’ Department of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) Queensland, Brisbane (2014) <http://era.daf.qld.gov.au/4492/1/fin-
synth-rep-econ-pest-mgment-sc-farms.pdf> accessed 31 July 2015.  
12 Nicolas M de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles; From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002). 
13 Ling Zhu and Yachao Zhao, ‘Polluter Pays Principle – Policy Implementation’ (2015) 45 Environmental Policy 
and Law 34. They eventually conclude that full internalisation is probably required. 
14 Consider for instance the words of N M de Sadeleer: ‘The apparent simplicity of the polluter pays principle 
masks a number of ambiguities and its outlines continue to be poorly defined at a legal level.’ Nicolas M de 
Sadeleer, Environmental Principles; From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002). 
15 Ling Zhu and Yachao Zhao, ‘Polluter Pays Principle – Policy Implementation’ (2015) 45 Environmental Policy 
and Law 34. 
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adding the finishing touches that will clarify [their] definition and scope.’16 It might be, 
therefore, that in evaluating legal principles in using qualitative methods such as these, we are 
ultimately tasked with applying, developing and further refining the meaning of 
environmental principles with a view to a more objective evaluation process in the future.  
 
Thirdly, establishing a connection between the implementation of a legal principle and 
evidence of ‘outcomes’ (i.e. step 4 of the method) is difficult, to say the least. As a team, we 
were of the view that outcomes are likely to be attributable to a variety of interconnected 
aspects of governance which are, it must be said, poorly understood from an empirical point 
of view. It is therefore difficult to claim with any degree of certainty that changes in particular 
circumstance represent (and only represent) an effective implementation of a single 
principle.
17
 Without the costs of pollution being accurately reflected in the balance sheets of 
individual farmers (not to mention the difficulties in researchers accessing those documents) 
drawing a link between implementation and outcomes becomes highly speculative.
18
  
The natural resource governance issue 
Sugarcane farming on Queensland’s Eastern coast has been damaging the water quality of the 
GBR for over one hundred years.
19
 The issue has been known about for some time. For 
instance, in 1981 when the GBR was first inscribed on the World Heritage List, it was noted 
that agricultural and industrial discharges were a threat to its health.
20
 A recent report by 
Australia’s Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority (GBRMPA) found that land based run-
off from agricultural activities continues to be one of the most significant threats to the reef.
21
  
 
Despite the long history of the problem, it is only very recently that the Australian scientific 
community has started to generate the necessary outcomes needed to identify the priority 
pollutants and the priority areas for effective management.
22
 The main causes of the pollution 
are now reasonably well understood to be increased sediment, nutrients (particularly nitrogen) 
and herbicides from the three main catchment areas which flow into the GBR.
23
 The 
Australian and Queensland Governments have taken actions in the last decade to improve 
                                                        
16 N de Sadeleer, The Polluter-Pays Principle in EU Law - Bold Case Law and Poor Harmonisation (2012). Pro 
Natura: Festskrift Til H. C. Bugge, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, pp. 405-419, 2012. Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2293317 at 418-419.  
17 One may be able to hypothesise to an extent, for example, that evidence of rising financial costs of cane farmers 
is evidence of effective implementation of the PPP, however such costs may also be attributable to other factors 
such as the purchasing or development of new technologies, changes to business or organisational structures, 
fluctuations in exchange rates, prices or export demand for sugar and so forth. 
18 Of course, evaluations of this kind are not an exact science, but for the sake of retaining simplicity and usability 
of the method by a wide variety of users, we have suggested changes to focus more intently on the implementation 
of multiple principles at two basic levels: in the law, and by the actions of the relevant stakeholders. The results of 
that analysis might sit anywhere on a predetermined spectrum: e.g. there was ‘no implementation’; there was 
‘partial implementation’; or there was ‘full implementation’. Thereafter, claims about improving natural resource 
governance by looking at ‘evidence of outcomes’ from a holistic point of view might be further pursued.  
19 M Smith, M J Poggio, M Thompson, and A Collier, ‘The Economics of Pesticide Management Practices on 
Sugarcane Farms: Final Synthesis Report. Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF), Queensland.’ 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) Queensland, Brisbane (2014). 
<http://era.daf.qld.gov.au/4492/1/fin-synth-rep-econ-pest-mgment-sc-farms.pdf> accessed 31 July 2015. 
20 Commonwealth of Australia ‘Reef 2050 Long-Term Sustainability (2015) available at 
<http://www.environment.gov.au> 9. 
21 Commonwealth of Australia ‘Reef 2050 Long-Term Sustainability (2015) available at 
<http://www.environment.gov.au> 1. 
22 J Waterhouse, J Brodie, S Lewis, A Mitchell, ‘The Catchment to Reef Continuum: Case studies from the Great 
Barrier Reef’ (2012) 65 Marine Pollution Bulletin 404.  
23 The three priority catchments for sugarcane run-off – the Wet Tropics, the Mackay Whitsundays and the 
Burdekin - are discussed later in this report. 
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water quality, but little is known about the longer term benefits of specific sugarcane 
management practices.
24
 This section of the report provides further background to the issue. 
Protected Areas in Australia 
Australia is home to wide variety of protected areas. Some of these are national parks 
(declared by each State Government, not the Australian Government) whilst others fall into 
various categories of refuges, marine parks, reserves, scientific management areas, wilderness 
areas, World Heritage sites, Ramsar wetlands, recreation reserves, indigenous protection areas 
and so on. Despite formal categories of protected areas stipulated by the IUCN,
25
 the 
terminology and status of protected areas varies between states and territories across Australia. 
There is also some overlap between State and Federal jurisdictions.
26
  
 
The protected area estate in Queensland (home to the GBR) is vast in global terms; however, 
it is still relatively small when compared with the national average in Australia. For example, 
Queensland is one of the largest and most biodiverse states in Australia, although national 
parks, the highest category of protected area under Queensland law, make up only 5% of 
Queensland’s area - one of the lowest percentages in Australian states. The biggest threats to 
protected areas and biodiversity are the impacts from climate change, cyclones, drought and 
fires, feral pests, weeds and disease, agricultural and mining activities and more recently, 
cattle grazing, development and ecotourism.  
 
World Heritage areas are one type of protected area which has been declared to be of 
international significance under the World Heritage Convention.
27
 There are currently 19 
World Heritage sites in Australia, with both cultural and natural attributes (some with both). 
Five World Heritage sites are found in Queensland including the Daintree Rainforest, Fraser 
Island, Wet Tropics, Australian Fossil Mammal Sites (Riversleigh) and the GBR. The GBR is 
the largest and perhaps the most well-known of all Australian World Heritage sites. World 
Heritage sites in Queensland are protected by a combination of both Queensland and 
Australian Law. There is some overlap in the protections provided.
28
   
Threats facing the GBR  
The GBR on the North-East coast of Australia is the largest coral reef system in the world. It 
consists of seventy habitat types that are either reef or non-reef (e.g. lagoons and seagrass 
beds).
29
  The GBR Marine Park (first established in 1975) contains diverse and globally 
significant species and habitats. It provides a vast number of goods and services including: 
                                                        
24 J R Agnew, K Rohde, A Bush. ‘Impact of Sugarcane Farming Practices on Water Quality in the Mackay 
Region.’ (2011) 33 Proc Aust Soc Sugar Cane Technology. 
25 International Union for the Conservation of Nature, ‘Protected Areas Categories’ 
<http://www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/gpap_home/gpap_quality/gpap_pacategories>  
26 World Heritage areas and Ramsar Wetlands, for example in Queensland, often fall within areas declared as 
national parks by the Queensland government. 
27 Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 1037 UNTS 151; 27 UST 
37; 11 ILM 1358 (1972). 
28 The GBR World Heritage site, for example, includes hundreds of individual islands, coves and inlets many of 
which themselves are declared national parks under Queensland law, but the area as a whole is protected as a 
single World Heritage site under Australian law as well. 
29 For more specific information on the various bioregions of the Great Barrier Reef (GBR) see Australian 
Government, Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, ‘Protecting the reef bioregions in the Great Barrier Reef 
Marine Park and World Heritage Area’ (2003). 
<http://www.gbrmpa.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0012/17301/reef-bioregions-in-the-gbrmp-and-gbrwh.pdf> 
accessed 22 May 2015.  
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food; tourism and recreation; coastal habitat and significant aesthetic value.
30
 Over seventy 
Indigenous Australian groups maintain a culturally-significant relationship with the GBR.
31
 In 
addition, the GBR supports and is connected to other coastal habitats including mangrove 
forests, riparian, wetlands and floodplains.  These areas also provide critical ecosystem 
functions such as the storage of carbon for climate change mitigation and adaptation.
32
  
 
The GBR has faced significant threats over the last thirty years, almost all of them resulting 
from human activity. The main threats include illegal fishing, pollution from land activities 
(e.g. sediment, nutrient and herbicide runoff), extreme weather events, invasive species (e.g. 
crown-of-thorns starfish), increased shipping, port development and climate change.
33
 These 
threats are similar to the threats facing coral reefs worldwide.
34
 We turn now to discuss one of 
the biggest threats to the health of the GBR and the focus of our research: pollution from 
sugarcane farming in the three ‘priority catchments’. 
Pollution from sugarcane farming affecting the GBR 
The health of water quality entering the GBR is particularly vulnerable to the use of 
agricultural chemicals in the catchment areas.
35
 A study by Lewis et al traced pesticide 
residues from rivers and creeks in three catchments which detected “several pesticides 
(mainly herbicides) in both freshwater and coastal marine waters and were attributed to 
specific land uses in the catchment.”36 These findings are part of an increasingly large body of 
scientific work that has detected harmful levels of agricultural chemicals entering the GBR.
37
 
Another related body of work has found that coastal and inshore parts of the GBR have been 
degraded as a result of these chemicals.
38
  
 
                                                        
30 Fredrik Moberg and Carl Folke, ‘Ecological Goods and Services of Coral Reef Ecosystems’ (1999) 29 
Ecological Economics 215, 216–217. 
31 Australian Government, Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, Traditional Owners of the Great Barrier 
Reef < http://www.gbrmpa.gov.au/our-partners/traditional-owners/traditional-owners-of-the-great-barrier-reef> 
accessed 21 May 2015.  
32 Catherine Lovelock and Joanna Ellison, ‘Vulnerability of mangroves and tidal wetlands of the Great Barrier 
Reef to climate change’ in Climate Change and the Great Barrier Reef (Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority: 
Canberra 2007) 238, 240.  
33 J Waterhouse, J Brodie, S Lewis, A Mitchell, ‘The Catchment to Reef Continuum: Case studies from the Great 
Barrier Reef’ (2012) 65 Marine Pollution Bulletin 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0025326X11005194> accessed 31 July 2015 
34 See, e.g., Terry P Hughes et al, ‘Climate Change, Human Impacts, and the Resilience of Coral Reefs’ (2003) 
301 Science 929. 
35 Australian Institute of Marine Science and the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef 
Studies, Pesticides compound climate risk to reef (2014) <http://www.aims.gov.au/docs/research/water-
quality/runoff/pesticides-climate-risk.html> accessed 21 May 2015. See also J Waterhouse, J Brodie, S Lewis, A 
Mitchell, ‘The Catchment to Reef Continuum: Case studies from the Great Barrier Reef’ (2012) 65 Marine 
Pollution Bulletin <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0025326X11005194> accessed 31 July 2015 
36 Stephen E Lewis et al, ‘Herbicides: A New Threat to the Great Barrier Reef’ (2009) 157 Environmental 
Pollution (Barking, Essex: 1987) 2470. 
37 M Smith, M J Poggio, M Thompson, and A Collier, ‘The Economics of Pesticide Management Practices on 
Sugarcane Farms: Final Synthesis Report. Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF), Queensland.’ 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) Queensland, Brisbane (2014) 
<http://era.daf.qld.gov.au/4492/1/fin-synth-rep-econ-pest-mgment-sc-farms.pdf> accessed 31 July 2015  
38 B R Bellwood, T P Hughes, C Folke, M Nystrom, ‘Confronting the coral reef crisis’ (2004) 429 Nature 827; J 
Brodie et al, ‘Spatial and Temporal Patterns of near-Surface Chlorophyll in the Great Barrier Reef Lagoon’ (2007) 
58 Marine and Freshwater Research 342; L M DeVantier et al, ‘Species Richness and Community Structure of 
Reef-Building Corals on the Nearshore Great Barrier Reef’ (2006) 25 Coral Reefs 329; Katharina E Fabricius and 
Glenn De’ath, ‘Identifying Ecological Change and Its Causes: A Case Study on Coral Reefs’ (2004) 14 Ecological 
Applications 1448. 
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The key pollutant activities are sugarcane, cattle farming and banana crops.
39
 The herbicide 
diuron, is a contaminant widely used in the GBR catchment areas as a herbicide, and has been 
described as essential for growing tropical crops like sugarcane.
40
 The sugarcane industry is 
the third largest user of diuron in Australia, and is a crop largely grown in GBR catchment 
regions.
41
  Diuron is particularly damaging to the GBR, and has been detected within the 
catchments and waters of the GBR.
42
 When released into waters, diuron can reduce the ability 
of the GBR’s ecosystems to photosynthesise.43 Diuron has been found to adversely impact 
seagrass,
44
 mangroves,
45
 coral
46
 and other species.
47
  
 
Other sources of agricultural pollution of the GBR include the use of the herbicides atrazine 
and hexazinone, and the increased use of nutrients such as nitrogen and phosphorous.
48
 
Dissolved inorganic nitrogen (DIN) from sugarcane farming is a particularly significant 
problem.
49
 DIN is sourced from many regularly used fertiliser products and operates to 
increase organic matter in the plankton and in sediments leading to higher outbreaks of coral 
disease and the invasive ‘crown of thorns starfish.’50 DIN from the three priority catchments 
(see map below) was recently reported to be the number one priority pollutant affecting water 
quality in the GBR.
51
 
The priority catchment areas 
Over eighty-five per cent of sugarcane production in Queensland is concentrated in three 
catchment areas: the Wet Tropics, Burdekin Dry Tropics and Mackay Whitsunday regions.
52
 
                                                        
39 J Waterhouse, J Brodie, S Lewis, A Mitchell, ‘The Catchment to Reef Continuum: Case studies from the Great 
Barrier Reef’ (2012) 65 Marine Pollution Bulletin 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0025326X11005194> accessed 31 July 2015  
40 Conor Duffy, ‘Common Herbicide “Threatens Great Barrier Reef”’ ABC News, 27 March 2012 
<http://www.abc.net.au/news/2012-03-27/bgreat-barrier-reef-herbicide/3914382> accessed 31 July 2015 
41 Glen Holmes, ‘Australia’s Pesticide Environmental Risk Assessment Failure: The Case of Diuron and 
Sugarcane’ (2014) 88 Marine Pollution Bulletin 7, 12. 
42  David Haynes et al, ‘The Impact of the Herbicide Diuron on Photosynthesis in Three Species of Tropical 
Seagrass’ (2000) 41 Marine Pollution Bulletin  279; A M Davis et al, ‘Environmental Impacts of Irrigated 
Sugarcane Production: Herbicide Run-off Dynamics from Farms and Associated Drainage Systems’ (2013) 180 
Agriculture, Ecosystems & Environment 123. 
43 Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority, Diuron, Scope Document (December 2002, 
Canberra) 4.2 ‘Current Use Patterns’ <http://apvma.gov.au/sites/default/files/publication/15296-diuron-review-
scope.pdf> accessed 22 May 2015. 
44 David Haynes et al, ‘The Impact of the Herbicide Diuron on Photosynthesis in Three Species of Tropical 
Seagrass’ (2000) 41 Marine Pollution Bulletin 288. 
45 For some corrections to the figures in the 2005 article and some updates, see Norman C Duke, ‘Corrections and 
Updates to the Article by Duke et Al. (2005) Reporting on the Unusual Occurrence and Cause of Dieback of the 
Common Mangrove Species, Avicennia Marina, in NE Australia’ (2008) 56 Marine Pollution Bulletin 1668. 
46 Ross J Jones et al, ‘Effects of Herbicides Diuron and Atrazine on Corals of the Great Barrier Reef, Australia’ 
(2003) 251 Marine ecology. Progress series 153; Andrew Negri et al, ‘Effects of the Herbicide Diuron on the Early 
Life History Stages of Coral’ (2005) 51 Marine Pollution Bulletin 370. 
47 Britta Schaffelke, Jane Mellors and Norman C Duke, ‘Water Quality in the Great Barrier Reef Region: 
Responses of Mangrove, Seagrass and Macroalgal Communities’ (2005) 51 Marine Pollution Bulletin 279. 
48 J R Agnew, K Rohde, A Bush. ‘Impact of Sugarcane Farming Practices on Water Quality in the Mackay 
Region.’ (2011) 33 Proc Aust Soc Sugar Cane Technology. 
49 J Waterhouse, J Brodie, S Lewis, A Mitchell, ‘The Catchment to Reef Continuum: Case studies from the Great 
Barrier Reef’ (2012) 65 Marine Pollution Bulletin.  
50 J Waterhouse, J Brodie, S Lewis, A Mitchell, ‘The Catchment to Reef Continuum: Case studies from the Great 
Barrier Reef’ (2012) 65 Marine Pollution Bulletin 397. 
51 J Waterhouse, J Brodie, S Lewis, A Mitchell, ‘The Catchment to Reef Continuum: Case studies from the Great 
Barrier Reef’ (2012) 65 Marine Pollution Bulletin 405. 
52 M Smith, M J Poggio, M Thompson, and A Collier, ‘The Economics of Pesticide Management Practices on 
Sugarcane Farms: Final Synthesis Report. Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF), Queensland.’ 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) Queensland, Brisbane (2014) 
<http://era.daf.qld.gov.au/4492/1/fin-synth-rep-econ-pest-mgment-sc-farms.pdf> accessed 31 July 2015  
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These are often referred to as the ‘priority catchment areas’.53 A 2012 study found that use of 
nitrogen fertilizer in these three areas was a top priority for policy management to address.
54
 
Approximately 80% of the total anthropocentric load of DIN is derived from sugarcane 
fertiliser losses as follows: the Wet Tropics (84%); the Lower Burdekin (80%); and Mackay 
Whitsundays (88%). 
 
 
The three priority sugarcane catchments. Map Source: Queensland Government. 
The economic significance of Queensland’s sugar industry  
Australia’s agriculture sector is a significant industry with the gross annual value estimated at 
around $40 billion.
55
 Sugarcane has been the predominant agricultural industry in coastal 
Queensland since the 19
th
 Century
56
 and today produces around 95% of Australia’s sugar.57 
About 80% of all sugar produced in Australia is exported around the world mainly to South 
Korea, Indonesia, Japan and Malaysia making Australia one of the world’s largest sugar 
exporters.
58
 The gross value of production of sugarcane to the Queensland economy in 2013-
                                                        
53 See the language of Chapter 4A of the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (QLD) discussed later on in this 
report. 
54 J Waterhouse, J Brodie, S Lewis, A Mitchell, ‘The Catchment to Reef Continuum: Case studies from the Great 
Barrier Reef’ (2012) 65 Marine Pollution Bulletin 401. 
55 Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Value of Agricultural Commodities Produced, Australia, year ended 30 June 
2014’ <http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mf/7503.0> accessed on 31 July 2015 
56 M Smith, M J Poggio, M Thompson, and A Collier, ‘The Economics of Pesticide Management Practices on 
Sugarcane Farms: Final Synthesis Report. Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF), Queensland.’ 
Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) Queensland, Brisbane (2014) 
<http://era.daf.qld.gov.au/4492/1/fin-synth-rep-econ-pest-mgment-sc-farms.pdf> accessed 31 July 2015  
57 Australian Government Department of Agriculture, ‘Agriculture Farming and Food website’ 
http://www.agriculture.gov.au/ag-farm-food/crops/sugar accessed 31 July 2015. 
58 Australian Government Department of Agriculture, ‘Agriculture Farming and Food website’ 
http://www.agriculture.gov.au/ag-farm-food/crops/sugar accessed 31 July 2015.  
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2014 was $1.165 billion which represents about 10% of the total value of all agricultural 
production in Queensland.
59
  
 
The sugar industry is therefore incredibly significant to Queensland and Australia’s economy. 
Many of the plans and policies we reviewed in this research underlined the importance of 
‘cost-effective’ and cooperative management strategies to preserve the livelihoods of cane 
farmers and the economic sustainability of their industry.
60
 The socio-economic importance 
of the region is also recognised as a significant management issue: 
 
“One of the most challenging aspects…is the incorporation of social and economic 
factors which can have a significance influence over land management in the GBR 
catchment.”61 
The legal principle being evaluated 
Background to the PPP 
The PPP is an accepted principle of international environmental law.
62
 It has its roots in the 
discipline of economics, requiring firms which create ‘externalities’ (that are, costs to society) 
to internalise those costs so that society does not have to pay for them.
63
 At its most basic 
level, the principle operates to shift the costs for pollution from the state to the polluter. The 
PPP is perhaps best understood by way of a simple example. A manufacturing plant may be 
authorised to manufacture equipment in a given area. The costs of production of its goods (for 
example, labour, raw materials, machinery, overheads etc) are direct costs the firm bears to 
operate its business. These costs are internalised as the firm is required to pay for them in 
advance and in return can sell its products to generate revenue. There are however, external 
costs which businesses may or may not be required to internalise in its pursuit of profit. These 
are known as externalities, or costs which the firm has shifted onto society.
64
 In the process of 
manufacturing for instance, the firm may emit gases, waste products or other pollutants into 
the environment. These costs will ultimately be borne by society through the funding of 
departmental monitoring and enforcement work and if needed, administration of the judicial 
system. The ultimate aim of the PPP is to apply cost pressures to polluters to ensure they 
change their behaviour either by stopping the polluting activities or by developing new 
approaches (at their own cost) to abate the pollution. 
                                                        
59 Queensland Government Statistician’s Office, ‘Gross value of production by commodity, Queensland, 2003–04 
to 2013–14’ http://www.qgso.qld.gov.au/products/tables/agriculture-gross-value-production/index.php accessed 31 
July 2015. 
60 For example, the Queensland Government ‘Reef Water Quality Protection Plan 2013’ 
http://www.reefplan.qld.gov.au/resources/assets/reef-plan-2013.pdf accessed 31 July 2015. 
61 J Waterhouse, J Brodie, S Lewis, A Mitchell, ‘The Catchment to Reef Continuum: Case studies from the Great 
Barrier Reef’ (2012) 65 Marine Pollution Bulletin. 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0025326X11005194> accessed 31 July 2015 405. 
62 Svitlana Kravchenko, Tareq M R Chowdury and Md J H Bhuiyan, ‘Principles of International Environmental 
Law’ in Shawkat Alam, Md J H Bhuiyan, Tareq M R Chowdury and Erika J Techera (eds), Routledge Handbook 
of International Environmental Law (Routledge Press 2013) 53. 
63 Sally A Joseph, ‘The Polluter Pays Principle and land remediation: a comparison of the United Kingdom and 
Australian Approaches’ (2014) 1 AJEL 24, 25. 
64 Sally A Joseph, ‘The Polluter Pays Principle and land remediation: a comparison of the United Kingdom and 
Australian Approaches’ (2014) 1 AJEL 24, 25. 
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Development of the PPP under international law 
The PPP has its foundations in international law in the early 1970’s. The Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (‘OECD’) first introduced the principle in 1972 in 
its ‘Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental 
Policies’.65 There, the principle was defined in broad terms: the polluter should bear the 
expenses of carrying out the pollution control measures decided by public authorities in order 
to ensure that the environment is in an acceptable state.
66
 Since that time, the PPP has been 
espoused in both binding and non-binding form in many operative and non-operative 
provisions of treaties concerning pollution.
67
 For example, the 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the 
Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources requires State, as far as possible, to consider 
‘the originator of the activity which may lead to environmental degradation responsible for its 
prevention, reduction and control as well as, wherever possible, for rehabilitation and 
remedial measures required’.68   
 
Courts at an international and regional level (in particular the European Court of Justice
69
) 
have also sought to apply and interpret the PPP.
70
 There are also several notable decisions 
where superior Courts around the world have invoked the principle.
71
 The acceptance of the 
PPP in environmental law, particularly in the European Community
72
 has led some authors to 
conclude it might have assumed the status of customary international law.
73
 
What might the PPP look like in practice? 
We have included what we consider the elements of the PPP to be in summary form at 
Annexure B. Our work here draws largely on academic commentary about the principle. 
That commentary suggests there exists debate about several aspects of the principle.
74
  We 
have endeavoured below to make our position clear about a few of the more contentious 
aspects of the PPP in order to move forward with the method.
75
 We acknowledge this 
                                                        
65 OECD, ‘Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies, 
Recommendation C(72)128’ (1972).  
66 OECD, ‘Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies, 
Recommendation C(72)128’ (1972) paragraph 4.  
67 Nicolas M de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles; From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002). 
68 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, available at 
<http://www.aseansec.org/6080.htm> Article 10(d) Several other international and regional instruments in use 
today invoke the PPP or some form of it, including the ‘Convention for the protection of the marine environment 
of the North-East Atlantic’ available at ospar.org accessed; the ‘Basel Convention on the Control of Trans 
boundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal’ available at <www.basil.ini> and the ‘Convention 
on Trans boundary Effects of Industrial Accidents’ available at <http://www.unece.org/> . For a full list see 
Philippe Sands, Jacqueline Peel (eds) Principles of International Environmental Law (3rd ed. Cambridge 
University Press 2012) 231-232 and also Nicolas M de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles; From Political 
Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002), 23.  
69 Arne Bleeker, 'Does the Polluter Pay? The Polluter-Pays Principle in the Case Law of the European Court of 
Justice' (2009) 18 European Energy and Environmental Law Review 6, 289–306. 
70 There are a broad range of cases that have considered its application. The US Chemicals Case, for instance, was 
a decision about the rules of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). There it was held that contracting 
parties can apply the PPP (although are not required to) in relation to tax adjustments. See Nicolas M de Sadeleer, 
Environmental Principles; From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002) 26. 
71 Sally A Joseph, ‘The Polluter Pays Principle and land remediation: a comparison of the United Kingdom and 
Australian Approaches’ (2014) 1 AJEL 24, 26. 
72 Nicolas M de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles; From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002), 27.  
73 Nicolas M de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles; From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002), 25. 
74 For a full discussion of the elements and their ambiguities, see Nicolas M de Sadeleer, Environmental 
Principles; From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002), 37-45. 
75 There are other areas of disagreement which we consider to be relatively minor in the application of this stage of 
the method. For instance, some scholars suggests that the PPP is concerned more with who should pay for 
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discussion represents several subjective judgments on our part, and point to this as one of the 
weaknesses of the method.
76
  
Is ‘state-funded’ support allowed? 
In its ‘purest’ form, the PPP calls for a full internalisation of the costs of pollution by 
polluters.
77
 There is, however, some debate about whether the PPP requires full or partial 
internalisation of costs by private actors, or, whether a state can provide subsidies or other 
forms of financial assistance. Zhu and Zhao, for instance, hypothesised that some level of 
state-funded support may be acceptable given the ‘decisive role’ public authorities play in 
environmental regulation today.
78
 A stricter interpretation of the PPP might disallow any form 
of financial assistance on the basis that environmental costs should be considered ‘a cost of 
doing business.’79 Under the strict interpretation, the PPP would preclude any public aid or 
tax payer support for remediation and pollution abatement costs.
80
 Whilst the PPP is ‘moving 
in the direction’ of full internalization, however, as de Sadeleer remarks, it is not there yet.81 
As such, we have adopted a more flexible (less strict) approach to this aspect of the PPP in 
this research. We see some level of state funded support as acceptable in limited 
circumstances.
82
 This is consistent with the ‘exceptions’ that are said to exist for the 
application of the PPP.
83
 
Internalisation of costs before or after the pollution? 
In its most basic application, the PPP requires polluters to pay for the costs of clean-up ‘after 
an incident’ including any enforcement or compliance costs, in addition to any compensation 
costs associated with individual injury or loss resulting from the pollution.
84
 However, the 
PPP is also recognised as having a preventative function:
85
  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
pollution rather than how much and for what: Ling Zhu and Yachao Zhao, ‘Polluter Pays Principle – Policy 
Implementation’ (2015) 45 Environmental Policy and Law 34. Others maintain the focus should be on how much 
should be paid rather than who should pay; Sally A Joseph, ‘The Polluter Pays Principle and land remediation: a 
comparison of the United Kingdom and Australian Approaches’ (2014) 1 AJEL 24. 
76 In truth, we found an ‘element by element’ analysis of the PPP ultimately unhelpful in carrying out the rest of 
the method and so we ‘retreated’ to a broader more holistic ‘feel’ of the principle when searching for its 
implementation. 
77 Sally A Joseph, ‘The Polluter Pays Principle and land remediation: a comparison of the United Kingdom and 
Australian Approaches’ (2014) 1 AJEL 24, 25. 
78 Although they eventually conclude that the PPP more or less requires full internalisation today, see Ling Zhu 
and Yachao Zhao, ‘Polluter Pays Principle – Policy Implementation’ (2015) 45 Environmental Policy and Law 34.  
79 Sally A Joseph, ‘The Polluter Pays Principle and land remediation: a comparison of the United Kingdom and 
Australian Approaches’ (2014) 1 AJEL 24, 28. 
80 Sally A Joseph, ‘The Polluter Pays Principle and land remediation: a comparison of the United Kingdom and 
Australian Approaches’ (2014) 1 AJEL 24, 27. 
81 Nicolas M de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles; From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002), 27.  
82 We suggest that our approach acknowledges the reality of modern governance and aligns with our assumptions 
of how regulatory decisions are made today – on the balance of a wide variety of views and often in sensitive and 
poorly understood socio-economic contexts. See Nicolas M de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles; From Political 
Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002). 
83 An exception to applying the principle strictly exists if firstly, without state assistance, there would be 
significant socio-economic ramifications; and/or secondly, where the assistance is primarily provided to encourage 
development of pollution control technologies. We note that where assistance is to be given, generally there is a 
requirement for it to be ‘selective’ and ‘targeted’ to the particular industry. That assistance should also be limited 
to pre-determined periods of time: Sally A Joseph, ‘The Polluter Pays Principle and land remediation: a 
comparison of the United Kingdom and Australian Approaches’ (2014) 1 AJEL 24, 28. 
84 Sanford E Gaines, ‘The Polluter-Pays Principle: From Economic Equity to Environmental Ethos’ (1991) 26 
Texas International Law Journal 463, 466. 
85 Nicolas de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford University Press, 
2002) 36-37. 
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‘Put at the service of prevention, the polluter-pays principle should no longer be 
interpreted as allowing a polluter who pays to continue polluting with impunity. The 
true aim of the principle would henceforth be to institute a policy of pollution 
abatement by encouraging polluters to reduce their emissions instead of being 
content to pay charges.’86 
 
In our research, and in line with our more flexible approach, we have adopted the view that 
internalisation of costs ‘at some point’ in the chain of pollution ought to be sufficient to 
represent an acceptable attempt at implementation of the principle. This might be in the form 
of pre-pollution ‘voluntary measures’ to reduce future impacts, or the payment of offsets or 
some other type of preventative action to abate their pollution impacts. This also calls into 
question ‘who is the polluter’ and who might be co-responsible for the pollution (see analysis 
below about consumers and producers). 
What is considered ‘pollution’? 
The definition of ‘pollution’ creates some difficulties for identifying the implementation of 
the PPP. A legal interpretation would probably require a ‘breach of the law’, that is, an 
unauthorised emission into air, water, biodiversity by a person or corporation.
87
 Such an 
emission would need to be above and beyond state-approved discharge levels for the 
particular activity (whether or not the safety of those levels is disputed or not). However, in 
our research, we more or less followed a more scientific definition of pollution and one that is 
specific to the nature of the problem we are investigating:  
 
‘[sugarcane pollution is] a concentration/load of material that is elevated above 
natural levels that are known to cause environmental harm [to the GBR].’88 
Who is considered the ‘polluter’? 
Like ‘pollution’, defining the polluter in the context of the PPP can be challenging.89 It is 
however a crucial aspect of implementing the principle. At the core of the PPP, we are told, is 
identifying ‘who’ should play for the pollution, rather than ‘how much’ or ‘how’ it should be 
paid for.
90
 Various attempts have been made at defining who is a polluter. The OECD Council, 
for instance, sought to define the polluter as: ‘whoever directly or indirectly damages the 
environment or creates conditions leading to such damage.’91 On the breadth of this definition, 
the canefarmers, the consumers of sugar creating demand, the manufacturers of sugar-based 
products, the manufacturers of fertilizers and even the State in subsidising the sugar industry 
might be considered ‘polluters’. However, in an effort to move forward with the method, we 
have concluded that the polluter should be the primary actor directly responsible for the 
pollution rather than their contractors, sub-contractors or suppliers etc. A different analysis 
                                                        
86 Nicolas de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford University Press, 
2002) 36. 
87 This is how many environmental laws currently approach the issue. That is, environmental harm can be 
‘authorised’ provided it doesn’t breach the levels stipulated by the State. An ‘Environmental Authority’ for 
instance in Queensland can be issued to authorise what would otherwise be Environmental Harm.  
88 J Waterhouse, J Brodie, S Lewis, A Mitchell, ‘The Catchment to Reef Continuum: Case studies from the Great 
Barrier Reef’ (2012) 65 Marine Pollution Bulletin 296. 
89 Nicolas M de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles; From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002). 
90 Ling Zhu and Yachao Zhao, ‘Polluter Pays Principle – Policy Implementation’ (2015) 45 Environmental Policy 
and Law 34.  
91 Nicolas M de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles; From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (OUP 2002) 28. 
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might explore varying conceptions of the ‘polluter’.  In our case the polluter is assumed to be 
the canefarmers. 
 
Further research: consumers and producers as ‘polluters’? 
This report has focused on farmers as potential ‘polluters’ when evaluating the PPP.  
However, a further two stakeholders might also be evaluated. The first is the manufacturer(s) 
of the products causing the pollution (e.g. nitrogen and herbicides). The second is the main 
consumer of the sugar – the sugar industry. In relation to the first, the agricultural chemical 
industry appears to be extremely concentrated, particularly in North America. This might 
make it easier to trace a particular chemical applied to crops back to the particular corporation 
and in turn evaluate that firms actions in abating pollution. However, case law from the 
United States and Canada illustrates a reluctance to recognise a link between the 
manufacturer of a farm input and responsibility for fixing the pollution.
92
 There appear to be 
few applications of the PPP by the State with respect to the chemical industry. In the United 
States, some companies are taxed to fund research into alternatives to particular chemical use, 
but it is a minimal fee and does not address the actual damage.
93
  
 
With regards to the consumer of sugarcane, large processed food companies rely on sugar for 
a range of products. Some food companies practising corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
seem to have adopted an approach consistent with internalisation of pollution costs. This may 
reflect a voluntary willingness to internalise the costs of pollution into their business. For 
instance, Coca-Cola is currently working with sugarcane farmers in the GBR catchment areas 
to improve water quality. It is claimed that this has ‘improved the water quality of more than 
26 billion gallons of runoff and drainage water.
94
 This provides an example of other industries 
‘implicated in the pollution’ taking some level of responsibility. Further research might 
examine other end users of sugarcane particularly in Asia where the vast majority of 
Queensland sugar appears to be exported. 
The method of evaluation 
The method of evaluation of the implementation of the PPP involved analysis of 
documentation at five distinct stages. Below is a summary of our results at each stage.  
STEP 1. Implementation of the principle into the law 
Australian environmental law, and more specifically Australian protected areas law, is 
heavily statute-based and largely the domain of individual State Governments and Territories 
in Australia. This is despite the fact that it is the Australian Government which is responsible 
to the international community under various international agreements, for instance in relation 
                                                        
92 Organic farmers have brought a case against seed companies when their organic crops have become “polluted” 
with genetically modified crops spread from neighbouring farms (which tend to be the same companies producing 
agricultural chemical inputs). These cases have generally involved negligence, nuisance and trespass. All cases of 
this kind have found in favour of the company (the defendant). See e.g., Hoffman v Monsanto Canada Inc. (2007), 
2007 SKCA 47; Organic Seed Growers and Trade Association et al. v. Monsanto Co et al, 851 F.Supp.2d 544, 
544-49 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  
93 William Vorley and Dennis Keeney, Bugs in the System: Redesigning the Pesticide Industry for Sustainable 
Agriculture (Routledge, 2014). 
94 WWF, Working with Coca-Cola to Improve the Sustainability of Agricultural Ingredients (2015) < 
https://www.worldwildlife.org/projects/working-with-coca-cola-to-improve-the-sustainability-of-agricultural-
ingredients> accessed 31 July 2015. 
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to World Heritage sites like the GBR. Therefore, at this stage, ‘evidence’ for our conclusions 
includes mostly Queensland law and some Australian statutes that sought to incorporate the 
wording of ‘polluter pays’ or otherwise referred to the substance of the PPP.95  
The PPP under Australian Law 
In Australian law (that is at the national level), the PPP is generally accepted to be a part of a 
broader concept known as Ecologically Sustainable Development (ESD) which also includes 
the Precautionary Principle and the Principle of Intergenerational Equity.
96
 Since 1992, ESD 
has provided the basis for a strategic framework of many of Australia’s environmental laws 
and has been widely viewed as a desirable form of environmental management.
97
 More 
specifically, the PPP is often included as part of a separate principle entitled: ‘improved 
valuation, pricing and incentive mechanisms’.98 Little guidance is given as to the meaning of 
the ‘improved valuation’ principle. The National Strategy on ESD99 developed in the early 
1990s refers to it as an example of a ‘cost effective and flexible policy instrument.’100 The 
part of the National Strategy that concerns agriculture is conspicuously silent on the PPP or 
indeed other ‘cost effective’ mechanisms for managing environmental impacts.101 Some 
guidance is provided by New South Wales law (which is not binding on Queensland, nor at a 
national level) which attempts a definition as: ‘environmental factors should be included in 
the valuation of assets and services.’102  
 
Despite the loose articulation of the PPP at a national level, the PPP appears to have been 
implemented in relevant Australian laws that govern the GBR. The most relevant for our 
research is the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBC 
Act) which is the main Australian law that protects matters of national environmental 
significance (MNES) including: 
 
 World Heritage, National Heritage and the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park; 
 Ramsar wetlands; 
 Listed migratory species, threatened species and communities; 
 Protection of the environment from nuclear actions; 
 Marine environments and Commonwealth fisheries; and  
                                                        
95 This may, for instance, be in the form of the payment of a bond or a requirement by the legislation to clean up or 
pay compensation to injured persons, wildlife or ecosystems. The burgeoning area of environmental offsets in 
Queensland, where developers can pay to offset their damage to the environment or establish another 
environmentally friendly project, provides an interesting aspect to this question. 
96 Australian Government, Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/about-us/esd/publications/intergovernmental-agreement> 3.5.4  
97 Andrew Lynch, ‘Legislating for Ecologically Sustainable Development’ 2 JCULR 8 1995 available online: 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/JCULawRw/1995/3.pdf>  
98 Australian Government, Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/about-us/esd/publications/intergovernmental-agreement>at 3.5.4. 
99 Australian Government National Strategy on ESD http://www.environment.gov.au/about-
us/esd/publications/national-esd-strategy accessed 31 July 2015. 
100 Australian Government National Strategy on ESD http://www.environment.gov.au/about-
us/esd/publications/national-esd-strategy-part1#GoalsEtc accessed 31 July 2015. 
101 Australian Government, Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment 
http://www.environment.gov.au/node/13010 accessed 31 July 2015. 
102  Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991 (NSW) s 6(2). Victorian law (again not binding) seeks 
to break down the elements further adding improved valuation means that ‘users of goods and services should pay 
prices based on the full life cycle costs of providing the goods and services’ and that ‘established environmental 
goals should be pursued in the most cost effective way by establishing incentive structures’: Environment 
Protection Act 1970 (Vic) s1F.  
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 Protection of water resources from coal seam gas and large coal mining development. 
 
The PPP is not specifically mentioned in the EPBC Act, however it is indirectly referred to 
within the objectives of the legislation. Section 3 of the Act requires the Australian 
Government to pursue the principles of ESD in implementing the Act. Section 3A of the Act 
defines ESD to include, amongst other things; ‘improved valuation, pricing and incentive 
mechanisms should be promoted.’ The incorporation of the PPP also flows through to 
particular decisions made under the EPBC Act. For instance, section 50 requires that the 
objects of the Act (the principles of ESD and therefore the PPP) be considered when entering 
into a ‘bilateral agreement.’103 Similarly, ESD must be considered when listing species in 
particular endangered categories such as endangered or critically endangered
104
, making 
declarations that ordinary environmental approval is not be required
105
 and when making 
threat abatement plans
106
, wildlife conservation plans,
107
 and recovery plans.
108
  
 
In addition, we suggest that the ‘intention’ of the PPP is reflected in a number of enforcement 
tools in Part 17 of the Act:  
 
 The imposition of a civil penalty, in which the Federal Court must have regard to 
(amongst others) the nature and extent of the contravention the nature, and the extent 
of any loss or damage suffered as a result of the contravention;
109
 and 
 Remediation orders made by the Federal Court or the Federal Environment 
Minister.
110
 
 
Problematically, however, the assessment and approval of agricultural pollution affecting the 
GBR does not seem to be captured by the EPBC Act. The EPBC Act is limited to assessing 
actions that may have a ‘significant impact’ on one of the several MNES listed above. The 
result is that many small, localised pollution events, which in isolation would have negligible 
impact on downstream ecosystems, are not assessed, recorded, punishable or otherwise 
regulated by the Act. There is no evidence that the Australian Government has applied the 
provisions of the EPBC Act to sugarcane activities in Queensland.
111
 Rather, their approach 
has been to defer to the framework of Queensland law and provide funding in support of joint 
endeavours like the newly established Reef Trust (discussed in step 3 below).  
 
In the context of Australian law, it is also worth briefly mentioning the Great Barrier Reef 
Marine Park Act 1975 (Cth). This Act establishes the GBR Marine Park and also the GBR 
                                                        
103 A bilateral agreement is an administrative arrangement under the Act which can detail the level of 
Commonwealth accreditation of Australian State practices, procedures, processes, systems, management plans and 
other approaches to environmental protection.   
104 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth), s 186. 
105 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) ss 37A-37C. 
106 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 271. 
107 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 287. 
108 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 270. 
109 Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) s 481(3)(a)-(b). It has been said that 
these factors in particular enable consideration of the PPP: The Hon. Justice Brian J Preston, Sustainable 
Development Law in the Courts: The PPP, The 16th Commonwealth Law Conference, Hong Kong, 7 April 2009, 
10.  
110 See Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth), Part 17 Divisions 14A and 14B.  
111 There is a technical legal argument about whether it should or would apply which is outside the scope of this 
report. Now that there is a strategic assessment completed for the GBR, the Australian Government may be able to 
assess and approve the run-off as a ‘class of actions’. 
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Marine Park Authority. The Act creates offences and penalties (and issues permits) in relation 
to the Marine Park. The principles of ESD and the PPP are included in the Act.
112
 However, 
the Act primarily deals with activities off the Queensland Coast and has very limited 
application to the pollution occurring as a result of sugarcane run-off which is largely the 
jurisdiction of Queensland law (see below). Nevertheless, the Marine Park Authority plays a 
significant role in maintaining the health of the GBR and is supportive of water quality 
measures adopted by the Australian and Queensland Governments.
113
  
The PPP under Queensland law 
The main law in Queensland that protects the natural environment is the Environmental 
Protection Act 1994 (Qld) (EP Act).
114
 Other laws affect decisions on planning and resource 
development in Queensland, but they have lesser relevance (in practice at least) to the impacts 
of sugarcane farming on the GBR.
115
 The results of our research show that the EP Act reflects 
the PPP both implicitly and explicitly. At the outset, it is given specific reference in the 
strategic objectives of the Act in much the same way as the Federal EPBC Act does. The 
main object of the EP Act is to protect Queensland’s natural environment whilst allowing for 
ESD which includes the PPP.
116
 This object is to be achieved through different ‘phases’ 
which involve identifying and setting environmental standards which can then be monitored 
and enforced.
117
 Part of achieving the EP Act’s objective includes a requirement that ‘persons 
who cause environmental harm [must] pay costs and penalties for the harm.’118 We 
determined this to be a direct reference to the restorative aspect of the PPP.  
 
The inclusion of the PPP in the objects of the EP Act was deliberate. When the EP Act was 
first introduced (in 1994), it was envisioned there should be ‘greater equity in distributing the 
cost of environment protection’, that is to say, a stronger emphasis on principles of economic 
redistribution, like the PPP.
119
 This was seen at the time to be in line with other States in 
Australia.
120
 Like the Federal EPBC Act, the PPP is part of the ‘improved valuation’ principle 
that those who generate pollution should ultimately bear the cost of containment, avoidance, 
                                                        
112 See Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 (Cth) ss 2A, 3AA and 3AB. 
113 Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority ‘Water Quality in the Great Barrier Reef’ 
<http://www.gbrmpa.gov.au/managing-the-reef/how-the-reefs-managed/water-quality-in-the-great-barrier-reef> 
accessed 31 July 2015. 
114 The Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) is administered by the Department of Environment and Heritage 
Protection (EHP), a State Government agency responsible to the Minister for Environment and Heritage Protection, 
National Parks and the Great Barrier Reef. EHP sets, monitors and enforces environmental standards in relation to 
a wide variety of environmental issues including; air and water quality, waste transportation and the impacts of 
mining, gas, chemical, industrial and intensive agricultural activities. It also has shared responsibility (alongside 
the Federal Government) for the ecological health of the GBR. 
115 For example, the Nature Conservation Act 1992 (Qld) establishes a framework for the dedication and 
management of national parks and other protected areas in Queensland. The GBR Marine Park consists of many 
hundreds of national parks and other protected areas under Queensland law. The Vegetation Management Act 1999 
(Qld) and the Sustainable Planning Act 2009 (Qld) work in tandem to protect unauthorised clearing of vegetation 
(including in water courses) although those laws were recently relaxed. It is likely the removal of riparian 
vegetation through agricultural activities is also having a significant impact on water quality in the GBR. See 
Taylor, M.F.J. 2013. Bushland at risk of renewed clearing in Queensland. WWF-Australia, Sydney. 
116 Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld), s 3. 
117 Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld), s 4. 
118 Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld), s 4(6)(d). 
119 Environmental Protection Bill 1994 (Qld) Explanatory Notes. 
120 Environmental Protection Bill 1994 (Qld) Explanatory Notes. 
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or abatement of that waste (i.e. the PPP).
121
  The PPP thus was part of the policy that 
underpinned early attempts at environmental protection in Queensland.
122
 
 
The EP Act also contains a variety of specific provisions which are consistent with making 
polluters ‘pay’ for their pollution. The vast majority of these appear to be manifestations of a 
restorative or ‘redistributive’ function (rather than ‘curative’ or ‘preventative’).123 A summary 
table of those provisions is provided at Annexure C. We note however, that the Queensland 
Government has refused to label the acts of sugarcane farmers to be ‘pollution’ at least in the 
legal sense, and hence the EP Act has had very little relevance. This is despite the specific 
regulation provisions contained in Chapter 4A of the Act. 
 
Specific regulation of sugarcane pollution (Chapter 4A EP Act)  
Some fifteen years after the EP Act was passed, a new Chapter 4A was introduced through 
the passing of the Great Barrier Reef Protection Amendment Act 2009 (Qld). Chapter 4A was 
intended to specifically provide for ‘great barrier reef protection measures’ over and above 
what was already provided for in the Act. The industry saw the introduction of regulations as 
unnecessary and opposed it at the time. Their opposition to strict forms of regulation still 
remains. The 2009 regulations were deemed necessary at the time as scientific evidence was 
increasingly showing that water discharge from rivers into the reef, including suspended 
sediments, nutrients and pesticides, continued to be of poor quality. “As a result” the 
government said, specific regulation aimed at the polluting activities was needed to “ensure 
that farm practices that impact on water quality are improved.”124 Chapter 4A operates by 
targeting two types of agricultural activities affecting the reef: sugarcane farming and cattle 
grazing.
125
 Both activities are caught by the regulations if they are undertaken on a 
commercial scale and are located within one of the three priority catchments areas (see map 
earlier in this report). Farmers in these areas are required to only apply a set amount of 
fertilizer to their soil and certain farmers also needed to prepare Environmental Risk 
Management Plans (ERMPs). 
 
There are certainly some aspects of Chapter 4A of the EP Act which are consistent with the 
PPP. However, these regulations are not currently being enforced by the Queensland 
Government who have instead focused on encouraging voluntary measures.
126
 If Chapter 4A 
were being enforced as originally intended, it would likely represent the most direct attempt 
yet at applying the PPP to sugarcane pollution. When the new chapter was first introduced in 
2009, it was envisioned that some (but not all) of the costs associated with the polluting 
                                                        
121 Australian Government, Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment 
<http://www.environment.gov.au/about-us/esd/publications/intergovernmental-agreement> at 3.5.4 
122 The adoption of the principle was (and perhaps still is) best reflected in the state’s contaminated land 
framework, previously contained in the Contaminated Land Act 1991 (Qld) but now found in Part 8 of the EP Act. 
Queensland’s contaminated land provisions are widely acknowledged to be premised on the PPP. The principle 
was deemed to be ‘in line’ with the goal of economic efficiency. In 1998, for instance, in her analysis of 
contaminated land law, Anna Kingsbury wrote; ‘Economic efficiency is in general harmony with the PPP. Where 
the polluter is liable for the costs of pollution, the polluter has an incentive to prevent pollution, and pollution costs 
can be internalized. See Kingsbury, Anna (1998) ‘Funding the Remediation of Contaminated Land in Australia 
and New Zealand: The Problem of Orphan Sites’ 6 Waikato Law Review 37. 
123 Nicolas de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford University 
Press, 2002) 36-37. 
124 Great Barrier Reef Protection Amendment Bill 2009 (Qld), Explanatory Notes page 1. 
125 Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) s 75(1). 
126 Queensland Audit Office, Report 20, 2014-15 <available at www.qao.qld.gov.au> 
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activities - that is allowing nutrient run-off to enter tributaries that flow to the reef - were to 
be borne by farmers. This required agricultural producers to internalize the costs of their 
‘polluting’ activities by requiring them to develop and implement ERMPs. There were some 
inconsistencies with how the internalization was to occur. For example, the regulations did 
not apply to all producers of sugarcane (only large commercial producers in the three priority 
catchments). Further, exemptions were proposed which stipulated that ‘no fees will be 
charged for assessment and accreditation of ERMPs’.127 In any event, the argument is a moot 
point as the regulations contained in Chapter 4A are not currently being enforced at all. 
The use of offsets: a form of polluter pays? 
The use of offsets to counterbalance or compensate for environmental harm is increasingly 
common in Australia. Several commentators link the mechanism of offsets to the PPP, as 
Gillespie describes as a way of paying ‘for damage planned in advance, as opposed to liability 
for wrongful acts.’128 Whilst they are not without their critiques, largely due to inconsistency 
in conservation objectives
129
 offsets do provide a mechanism for governments to force 
industry to internalize their external environmental costs.
130
 The most common types of offset 
schemes in Australia are carbon offsets and biodiversity offsets.  
 
Biodiversity offsets involve the person or entity, which contributed to the biodiversity losses, 
funding measures that address and compensate for the adverse impacts.
131
 In the case of the 
GBR, it would function as the ‘polluter’ providing funds to GBRMPA to undertake measures 
that protect the GBR’s diversity. At both the national and state level in Australia there are 
already off-set schemes, but they do not seem to apply to the agricultural pollution we are 
examining. There is some suggestion that funds raised from offsets from other activities (port 
development) will be used to fund water quality initiatives. Even this does not represent an 
application of the PPP, at least in a strict sense, as the industry responsible for the pollution is 
ultimately not the same as the one paying for it and thus there is no incentive to change 
behaviour. 
 
STEP 2. Implementation of the principle into governance 
processes 
At this stage of the method we investigated whether the PPP had moved outside of the law 
and into any of other processes of governance (e.g. policies, plans, strategic documents, 
guidelines etc.). Here we were searching for a particular commitment to the PPP in decision-
making, or at the very least, some type of policy or other guiding document which required 
industry to bear the costs of remediation and future abatement of nitrogen and pesticide use in 
                                                        
127 Great Barrier Reef Protection Amendment Bill 2009 (Qld), Explanatory Notes page 3. 
128 Alexander Gillespie, ‘A Missing Piece of the Conservation Puzzle: Biodiversity Offsets’ Report prepared for 
the Department of Conservation, 29 March 2012 < http://www.doc.govt.nz/documents/conservation/missing-
piece-of-the-conservation-puzzle.pdf> 2. 
129  Joseph W. Bull, K. Blake Suttle, Ascelin Gordon, Navinder J. Singh and E. J. Milner-Gulland (2013). 
Biodiversity offsets in theory and practice. Oryx, 47, pp 369-380. doi:10.1017/S003060531200172X. 
130 The Hon. Justice Brian J Preston, ‘Sustainable Development Law in the Courts: The Polluter Pays Principle’ 
The 16th Commonwealth Law Conference, Hong Kong, 7 April 2009, 10. 
131 NSW Office of Environment and Heritage Biodiversity Offsets 
<http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/biodivoffsets/>. 
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the catchment areas. In terms of identifying the stakeholders, we adopted a broad view of 
‘governance’ as:  
 
“Governance is not the same as government. It includes the actions of the state and, 
in addition, encompasses actors such as communities, businesses, and NGOs.”132 
 
After identifying the relevant stakeholders we proceeded to search their websites, policy 
documents, media releases and other available documentation to determine if the PPP was 
driving or guiding their decision-making. We used a keyword search including words like 
‘polluter pays’; ‘externalities’; ‘costs of pollution’; ‘remediation’ ‘abatement costs’; ‘industry 
investment’, ‘new technologies’ and so forth, focussing on who was funding a particular 
measure. Our analysis at this stage did not involve searching for broader ‘behaviours’ of 
stakeholders which also might evidence implementation of the PPP such as the allocation of 
funding, establishment of partnerships and programs, research institutions, projects and so 
forth. Although we admit there is overlap here,
133
 the analysis of ‘behaviours’ were perhaps 
more suitable to stage 3 of the method. The results of analysis at this stage are summarised 
below. 
Implementation into Government Processes  
A commitment to the PPP was not explicit in the main government policy and strategic 
documents we reviewed which were relevant to the management of pollution of the GBR 
caused by sugarcane. The Reef 2050 Long Term Sustainability Plan
134
 (2050 Plan), for 
instance, is a joint plan between the Australian Government and the Queensland Government. 
Whilst the 2050 Plan acknowledges that land based run-off from sugarcane is a significant 
threat,
135
 it does not specifically refer to the PPP in addressing the issue. It does, however, 
refer to management of the GBR region, as a whole, needing to be in accordance with 
principles of ESD of which the PPP is included (see step 1. above).
136
 This does reflect at 
least a commitment to some vague implementation of the PPP in decision-making processes, 
albeit specific reference to the PPP, what it means and how it is to be applied in terms of 
agricultural impacts are omitted.   
 
Like the 2050 Plan, the Reef Water Quality Protection Plan 2013 (the Reef Plan) is a joint 
commitment of the Australian and Queensland Governments. The primary focus of the Reef 
Plan is addressing the pollution resulting from land uses in the GBR catchments. Unlike the 
2050 Plan, however, the Reef Plan does not refer to the PPP nor the principles of ESD. Rather 
the Reef Plan highlights the need to make ‘cost effective’ reductions in pollutants in terms of 
costs to farmers and the state. This is a particular acknowledgement of the socio-economic 
sensitivities of the issue, rather than a ‘hard and fast’ commitment to the PPP: 
 
                                                        
132 Lemos, Maria Carmen and Arun Agrawal, “Environmental Governance,” (2006) 31 Annual Review of 
Environment Resources 298. 
133 In terms of insight into the method at this point, we found there is some overlap between stages 2, 3 and 4 and 
suggest that perhaps these stages ought to be combined in future applications of the method. 
134 Australian Government, Reef 2050 Long-Term Sustainability Plan 
<www.environment.gov.au/marine/gbr/publications/reef-2050-long-term-sustainability-plan>.  
135 Australian Government, Reef 2050 Long-Term Sustainability Plan 
<www.environment.gov.au/marine/gbr/publications/reef-2050-long-term-sustainability-plan> 1. 
136 Australian Government, Reef 2050 Long-Term Sustainability Plan 
<www.environment.gov.au/marine/gbr/publications/reef-2050-long-term-sustainability-plan> 35. 
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“Within the overall management system, Reef Plan focuses on the suite of 
complementary practices that need to be implemented in a systematic way to achieve 
cost effective pollutant reductions.”137 
 
One of the key components of the Reef Plan is the Paddock to Reef Integrated Monitoring, 
Modelling and Reporting Program. First established in 2009, the Paddock to Reef Program 
was updated in 2013 and will continue through to 2018. The program is a key aspect of 
delivering the Reef Plan, and more specifically of measuring the success of the Reef Plan’s 
goals and targets. The Australian and Queensland Governments have recently reported that in 
practice, the Reef Programme (the Australian Government’s primary contribution to 
delivering the Reef Plan)
138
 “leverages an average of around $1.60 private co-investment for 
every $1 disbursed.”139 This appears to be consistent with internalising pollution costs and at 
least a partial application of the PPP. 
Implementation into Industry and NGO processes 
Industry has generally recognised the problem of agricultural run-off and has sought to rectify 
the situation. However, they have pushed to reform the industry only in the context of 
maintaining or improving crop yields. Generally, the ‘governance’ approach of the industry 
has been to encourage self-regulation and voluntary methods of fertiliser reduction.
140
 Peak 
industry group Canegrowers have rejected strict regulation claiming the Chapter 4A 
provisions of the EP Act were introduced under ‘pressure from green groups’.141 Thus their 
governance approach relies almost exclusively on voluntary abatement programs. The 
development of the Smartcane Best Management Practice (BMP) in conjunction with the 
Queensland Government in 2013 is a key governance document which sets the standards and 
direction that canefarmers may wish to adopt. The industry claims that the BMP is ‘driven by 
and owned by growers [and is] verified by leading scientists’142 The BMP is voluntary and 
there is no penalty for not adopting it or complying with assessment or accreditation under it. 
 
In relation to the PPP, the BMP does very loosely discuss funding for some of its 
implementation. The general theme, however, is that improvements to farm practices should 
be undertaken so far as 'time and finances permit'.
143
 Whilst this does imply that the farmer 
themselves pay the cost for making improvements concerning water sources and run-off, 
there are a number of instances where the BMP specifically recommends that the user attempt 
to obtain funding from various public sources. For example when discussing replacing native 
vegetation around wetland areas (vital to controlling sediment run-off), the BMP suggests that 
users 'may need financial and labour assistance to successfully undertake such work. 
Assistance is often available from local revegetation practitioners working for Landcare or 
similar NGOs'.
144
 It is also recommended that farmers utilize local Landcare offices and/or 
the Local Council to be a 'broker' and arrange funding for various projects.
145
 Similarly, it is 
                                                        
137 Queensland Government, Reef water quality protection plan (2013) < http://www.reefplan.qld.gov.au/> 25 
138 Australian Government and Queensland Government Reef 2050 Plan – Investment Baseline (June 2015) 13. 
139 Australian Government and Queensland Government Reef 2050 Plan – Investment Baseline (June 2015) 14. 
140 Queensland Audit Office, Report 20, 2014-15 <available at www.qao.qld.gov.au> 
141 Smartcane ‘About the BMP’ <https://www.smartcane.com.au/aboutBMP.aspx> 
142 Smartcane ‘About the BMP’ <https://www.smartcane.com.au/aboutBMP.aspx> 
143 Smartcane Best Management Practice available at <www.smartcane.com.au> 12 
144 Smartcane Best Management Practice available at <www.smartcane.com.au> 18 
145 Smartcane Best Management Practice available at <www.smartcane.com.au> 20 
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recommended that NGO groups be approached for financial assistance.
146
 That said, the BMP 
does also mention pools of funds that the industry does itself contribute to. For example, 
landholders in the Burdekin district have signed management agreements pledging to 
contribute to a pool of local, state and federal funding to employ a contractor to control weeds 
4-times per year for an initial period of 3 years. It also recommends that users support the 
pooling of stakeholder funding.
147
 Overall, therefore, the BMP does seem to make some 
limited effort to direct industry in paying for their own cost of restoration of the wetlands and 
thus reducing run-off. Those payments are not compulsory, and are supported largely by 
public funds, suggesting that the BMP reflects only a partial implementation of the principle 
(at perhaps a very low level). Indeed, a recent Queensland Audit Office report found that 
under the Smartcane BMP, ‘the balance between producing more, making more money and 
looking after the environment is tilted towards the former two.’148 
 
NGOs like WWF have been focussing their efforts in recent years on campaigning to reduce 
the impacts of run-off on the GBR.
149
 Their approach to governance appears to be to partner 
with industry and government to help reduce nitrogen and herbicide run-off. There has been a 
persistent general call to increase the level of Government funding provided to remedy the 
issue (rather than levying industry).
150
 Whilst there is some dismay at the BMP process,
151
 
another initiative - Project Catalyst (discussed in more depth below) - appears to have been 
effective in raising the issues of reef run-off and influencing canefarmers to change their 
practices and internalise pollution costs.
152
 There is, however, a clear acknowledgement by 
groups like WWF that farmers cannot ‘do all the heavy lifting’ and that others along the 
supply chain (chemical producers, processed food industry etc) should assist with funding 
initiatives to reduce pollution.
153
 This seems to be occurring  with companies like Coca Cola 
involved in funding initiatives to reduce reef run-off.
154
 Coca Cola has invested $2.5 million 
towards the issue over a period of five years.
155
 All this seems to imply a collaborative (rather 
than combative) approach to governance. This is not inconsistent with the PPP if it in fact it 
encourages farmers to either absorb a higher portion of costs of the pollution going forward or 
changing their practices to avoid that. What appears to be missing from these governance 
processes, at least in terms of our research, is a longer term and more specific commitment to 
the PPP. There is a general reluctance by any of the governance actors (state and non-state) to 
label the run-off as ‘pollution’ or the farmers as ‘polluters’. This is perhaps understandable 
given the socio-economic sensitivity of the issue. 
                                                        
146 Smartcane Best Management Practice available at <www.smartcane.com.au> 31 
147 Smartcane Best Management Practice available at <www.smartcane.com.au> 20 
148 Queensland Audit Office, Report 20, 2014-15 <available at www.qao.qld.gov.au> 4. 
149 WWF – Australia, ‘threats to the GBR-freshwater pollution 
<http://www.wwf.org.au/our_work/saving_the_natural_world/oceans_and_marine/priority_ocean_places/great_ba
rrier_reef/threats/freshwater_pollution/> accessed 31 July 2015. 
150 WWF have sought an increase in investment of $500 million. See: WWF – Australia, ‘Reef Report Card three 
years overdue <http://www.wwf.org.au/?6620/Reef-report-card-three-year--overdue> 
151 WWF- Australia, ‘Sugar deal needed for reef http://www.wwf.org.au/?8560/Sugar-deal-needed-for-Reef 
152 ABC News Local, ‘Farmers and WWF work together to protect Great Barrier Reef’ 23 March 2015 
<http://www.abc.net.au/local/photos/2015/03/23/4202945.htm> 
153 ABC News Local, ‘Farmers and WWF work together to protect Great Barrier Reef’ 23 March 2015 
<http://www.abc.net.au/local/photos/2015/03/23/4202945.htm> 
154 Sydney Morning Herald, ‘Coca Cola pours sweetener on ailing barrier reef’ 12 January 2010 
<http://www.smh.com.au/business/cocacola-pours-sweetener-on-ailing-barrier-reef-20100112-m5cy.html> 
155 WWF-Australia ‘Working with business: Project Catalyst’ 
<http://www.wwf.org.au/about_us/working_with_business/project_sponsorships/project_catalyst/> accessed 31 
July 2015. 
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STEP 3. Behavioural changes in key institutions  
 
In this step, we tried to survey the broader actions of various actors involved in environmental 
governance including: Government (State and Federal); industry; and NGOs. As with step 2 
of the method, the data for our analysis came from publicly available material mainly online. 
We were looking for broader actions these stakeholders had initiated and whether those 
actions were consistent with implementing the PPP. A summary of the results of our analysis 
are contained in Annexure A. Two of the more interesting aspects of behaviour - the 
establishment of the Reef Trust and Project Catalyst - are further elaborated upon below.  
The Reef Trust 
The Reef Trust is effectively a holding mechanism designed to distribute government and 
(eventually) private funds to improve aspects of the ecological health of the GBR.
156
 
Specifically, the focus of the trust is on improving coastal habitats as well as water quality 
throughout the GBR and adjacent catchments.
157
 To date, the Reef Trust has relied almost 
solely on government revenue. An initial investment of $40 million was provided by the 
Australian Government with $100 million provided a short time later. It is anticipated that the 
trust will also attract and distribute philanthropic and private funds possibly from the 
Queensland sugar industry in future years. A recent report by Griffith University (funded by 
NGOs) found that if it is well-designed and implemented the trust ‘should improve the 
efficiency of current investment as well as mobilise more private sector capital’ and that it 
may be ‘an ideal way of consolidating and distributing funds raised through financial offsets 
mechanisms.’158 This is promising in terms of implementation of the PPP. 
 
Reef Trust distribution example  
 
The below quote is taken directly from a recent Reef Trust tender FAQ document. It shows 
how the program attempts to distribute funds to encourage pollution reduction. 
 
“This Programme offers an innovative way to encourage cane farmers to put a price on the 
cost of improving nitrogen use efficiency. It offers an up-front payment and then annual 
payments over three years to cane farmers to improve nitrogen use efficiency and farm 
sustainability, thereby reducing losses from the paddock to waterways and the Great Barrier 
Reef. It is not meant to reduce sugarcane crop productivity. Cane farmers can apply to 
improve their nitrogen use efficiency through a market-based competitive tender. Tenders are 
awarded based on the best value for money in improving nitrogen use efficiency on farm. 
Successful Applicants will receive annual payments equal to their tender bid until 2018.”159 
 
                                                        
156 Shields, Katherine, Andrew Fischer, and Chris Burke. "Toward an improved ecosystem based management 
approach: incorporating catchment characteristics into better management and planning of the Great Barrier Reef 
marine ecosystem." Journal of Environmental Planning and Management ahead-of-print (2014): 1-21. 
157 Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority ‘Managing the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park’ (2014)  
<http://hdl.handle.net/11017/2873> 
158 Jim Binney and Dr Chris Fleming, ‘Realising the Reef Trust - concepts, options and opportunities: A report for 
World Wildlife Fund International, the Australian Marine Conservation Society, and Griffith University’ (2014) 
available at <https://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/601535/Reef-Trust-FINAL.pdf> 
159 Terrain, ‘Reef Trust Fact Sheet One Overview Final - Terrain NRM’ available from www.Terrain.org.au 
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The use of the trust to encourage pollution abatement is positive. The support from 
Government is targeted and limited (three years) and reflects an attempt to gradually 
encourage farmers internalise the costs of nitrogen reduction. This is consistent with a 
reasonable interpretation of the PPP. After three years, however, if the farmer reverts back to 
high yield-high pollution scenario, the implementation of the PPP would have failed. 
 
The establishment of the trust in and of itself does reflect a limited attempt at implementing 
the PPP. As discussed above, the PPP requires the internalisation of costs by the polluter in an 
effort to change behaviour and reduce pollution impacts. The creation of a mechanism to raise 
private funds to pay for abatement schemes does reflect this. Whilst the initial funds for the 
trust are 100% government-sourced, the Australian Government makes clear that some future 
funding ‘will be derived from the pooling of offset funds that target specific impacts on the 
Great Barrier Reef from development activities.’160 The payment of offsets by ‘polluters’ 
(although controversial) can represent an application of the PPP in particular instances.
161
  
 
In the case of the Reef Trust it is unclear whether offsets will be specifically provided by the 
sugar industry or provided by other developments impacting the reef (dredging, port 
development, shipping, coastal development and so on). The 2014-2105 Reef Trust 
Investment Strategy states that one of the principles of investment of the trust is that 
investment must target the species or ecosystem that is being threatened by the activities.
162
 
There must be a connection between the impacts and the delivering of the offsets. For 
example, it is expected that offset funds derived from damaging agricultural practices should 
be applied to ecological impacts of those activities. It appears, however that the trust will take 
a broad view of this type of expenditure.  
 
The Reef Trust Investment Strategy gives an example of offset funds being raised from a 
development which impacts on water quality but that those offset funds might be spent on 
‘catchment wide projects’ combating nutrient and sediment run-off.163 Some commentators 
have considered this to amount to ‘a levy on developers who damage the Great Barrier Reef, 
with the funds set to be used in ways that are obscure and – if past performance is any guide – 
possibly ineffective.’164 This does not represent a true application of the PPP, as although 
there may be ‘payments’ it is being paid by a polluter who is different from the one causing 
the pollution. There is therefore no connection between the actions of the polluter and the 
pollution they are causing (see our suggested elements of the PPP at Annexure C). 
 
Overall, the existence of a Reef Trust Investment Strategy does seem to satisfy the 
requirement for any government funded support of the PPP to be targeted and limited in its 
                                                        
160 Australian Government, ‘2014-2105 Reef Trust Investment Strategy – Initiative Design and Phase 1 Investment’  
available at <http://www.environment.gov.au> 6. 
161 The 16th Commonwealth Law Conference, Hong Kong, 7 April 2009   
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Sustainable Development Law in the Courts:  The Polluter Pays Principle 
162 Australian Government, ‘2014-2105 Reef Trust Investment Strategy – Initiative Design and Phase 1 Investment’  
available at <http://www.environment.gov.au> 10.  
163 Australian Government, ‘2014-2105 Reef Trust Investment Strategy – Initiative Design and Phase 1 Investment’  
available at <http://www.environment.gov.au> 12. 
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application. However, it must be made clear how polluters will eventually pay for their 
pollution. There is no requirement for funding from the Reef Trust to be from the sugar 
industry, although, funds will are likely to be spent on nutrient run-off from the trust. This 
fails even a more relaxed implementation of the PPP. Overall, as the Griffith University study 
concluded: 
 
‘major cash investments have tended to be sourced from consolidated government 
revenues’ and that ‘options to leverage private sector capital to enhance the 
resilience of the GBR have not been used to their full potential.’165  
 
It remains to be seen whether the Reef Trust can leverage private capital and encourage 
abatement in line with the objectives of the PPP, although the potential as a mechanism for 
doing so, is certainly there. 
Project Catalyst 
Project Catalyst is an interesting partnership established between several different 
stakeholders including Queensland farmers, Natural Resource Management group (Terrain) 
the Australian Government, WWF and The Coca-Cola Foundation.
166
 $2.5 million was 
originally provided by Coca Cola over a period of five years.
167
 Now in its fifth year, the 
project has funded significant research into reducing the impacts of sugar cane pollution on 
the reef.
168
 One of the aims of Project Catalyst is to link local cane farmers with leading 
international organisations like Coca Cola and WWF and attempt to improve their farming 
practices. To date, there appear to be about 80 farmers involved in the program covering over 
80,000 hectares of land.
169
  
 
The establishment of Project Catalyst does represent which is partially consistent with 
implementing the PPP. Coca Cola as a significant end user of sugarcane (and possibly a ‘co-
polluter’) is providing funds from its own business to assist in this issue. In addition, farmers 
are being asked to absorb some financial cost in changing their practices. Whilst the bulk of 
the funds do seem to be coming from other sources, the willingness of farmers to amend their 
practices does evince an intention to internalise some costs of change. Interestingly, not all 
stakeholders are promoting the Project Catalyst initiative. Peak sugar industry body 
Canegrowers, for instance, sees overlap and inconsistencies with the work being undertaken 
and have refused to back the initiative.
170
 This is evidence of industry push back against 
particular initiatives and shows the difficulties with delivering a collaborative multi- effective 
resolution to this issue. It also represents something of a a reluctance from industry to work 
with all actors to internalise pollution costs. A lack of coordination and clear vision between 
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166 Reef Catchments ‘Project Catalyst’ <http://reefcatchments.com.au/land/project-catalyst/> access 31 July 2015. 
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several overlapping initiatives (both public and private) has hampered the response to this 
issue and has been recently criticised as a failed aspect of governance.
171
 
STEP 4. Evidence of outcomes of implementation 
At this stage, the most difficult stage of the method, we were searching for evidence that the 
PPP actually had been implemented. We were tasked with finding ‘objective’ evidence that 
the PPP had been put to use and that some tangible outcomes had come about. We settled on 
the following ‘outcomes’: 
 
1. A reduction of sugarcane nutrient and pesticide run-off and evidence of improved 
water quality entering the GBR; 
2. Majority of costs for abatement being borne (at least increasingly) by polluters and 
not necessarily by government.
172
 
Reduction of sugarcane pollution in real terms 
The core aim of the PPP is to change the negative behaviour of polluters. It is intended to not 
simply punish the polluter but to encourage the ‘rational use of scarce environmental 
resources’.173 We might therefore expect to see a real change in polluter behaviour and, as a 
result, an accompanying reduction in sugarcane pollution of the GBR.
174
 Evidence for that 
would likely include scientific data on contaminant levels measured from some tangible 
baseline (e.g. nitrogen levels in the catchments from 2009-2014) and accompanying analysis 
of whether those contaminants may have decreased.  
 
There are indeed claims that the voluntary programs aimed at changing farmer behaviour 
have been working. Government, for instance, claims that annual sediment load has reduced 
by 11 percent, pesticides by 28% and nitrogen by 10% when compared to a 2009 baseline.
175
 
However, assessment of the success of government led programs is reported elsewhere to be 
particularly tentative. The 2050 Plan for instance stated that ‘there is likely to be significant 
lag before overall water quality improvements are measured in the region’176 and that 
‘overcoming the impacts of 150 years of land use change is predicted to take many years.177 
Australia’s peak scientific body on marine science agrees: 
 
‘A lot of good work has been done…but it will probably take another decade or so 
that we have clear data that shows we have made a difference.’178 
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172 We stress that our observations in this part of the method are tentative. In our view, this is the weakest step in 
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173 OECD, ‘Guiding Principles Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies, 
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175 Australian Government, Reef 2050 Long-Term Sustainability Plan 
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Elsewhere, there are suggestions that the current approach to ‘voluntary governance’ has not 
worked as well as first thought. For instance, the Government acknowledges that the Reef 
Plan’s goal of 50% reduction in DIN by 2018 will not be met by voluntary best practice 
measures.
179
 In the coming years, an additional $5 million is being provided to the Wet 
Tropics region through the Reef Trust to tackle this problem.
180
 Those funds are being 
provided by market based competitive tender solely by the Government. 
 
Overall, there is insufficient evidence to conclude that current water quality programs have 
been effective in managing the impacts of pollution. Certainly no extensive cost-benefit 
analysis has been undertaken in this regard. As Agnew et al concluded there is only a limited 
amount of sugarcane-based work taking place on ‘defining the effects of different farm 
management practices.’181 Despite the government’s claims, therefore, we are unable to 
conclude that there has been a reduction in pollution loads in real terms and that any reduction 
that has occurred is attributable to the implementation of the PPP. This is despite the fact that 
we found some evidence of partial implementation of the PPP in the law and in governance 
processes. 
No significant costs for run-off being borne by government (public) 
The PPP is at its heart an economic tool to change behaviour. It assumes rational actors will 
change their behaviour to preserve or avoid undue costs to business. The internalisation of 
these costs is the main aim of the principle and thus we might expect to find abatement costs 
being met increasingly by the cane industry. This evidence is difficult to obtain, given we are 
not in a position to access the financial statements of the farmers. We can, however, start to 
investigate where the majority of funds (public and private) appear to be coming from and 
what initiatives they are going into.   
 
‘The Reef 2050 Plan – Investment Baseline’ (‘Baseline Investment Report’), released in June 
2015 by the Queensland and Australian Governments, provides an overview of the recent 
investment in GBR management and research (both public and private).
182
 The report 
confirms what we have read elsewhere that the majority of abatement measures are being met 
by public funds. For example, in 2014-2015, the Queensland Government provided $35 
million in funding to GBR water quality initiatives, including the BMP program,
183
 and has 
committed to a further $100 million over five years specifically towards water quality 
initiatives. As aforementioned, Government has also committed $140 million to establish the 
Reef Trust to fund, amongst other things, water quality improvements.
184
 Although the Reef 
Trust has “been designed to consolidate investment from a range of sources,”185 there are no 
current estimates of the expected investment from sugarcane industry, with the government 
acknowledging that such work is yet to be completed.
186
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Having said that, the Baseline Investment Report does indicate that of the estimated $485 
million invested in the 2014-2015 period, $18.9 million was provided by landholders, $10 
million by large businesses and $6.08 million by small businesses.
187
 Of all this non-
government investment, the majority was in agricultural and urban water quality.
188
 This does 
confirm our findings elsewhere that funds are being provided by the agricultural industry to 
tackle the problem. An extensive breakdown of the costs (i.e. from whom and into what 
initiatives) is however not available. 
 
Finally, it is worth noting that the Baseline Investment Report reveals that none of the guiding 
principles for the investment framework directly or indirectly concerns the PPP.
189
  The 
absence of the PPP in the guiding investment principles is in conflict with earlier government 
representations in the Reef 2050 Plan that decision-makers will have regard to the principles 
of ESD including the PPP.
190
 
STEP 5. Conclusions, validation and further research 
Our conclusions in this report are limited which reflects the exploratory nature of the research. 
Ultimately, we have come to the view that there has been some attempt by some canegrowers 
to internalise the costs of pollution into their everyday practices.
191
 This action has been 
largely driven by Australian and Queensland governments through the Reef Trust and other 
funding initiatives but also through private governance initiatives like Project Catalyst. There 
has been significant movement of late by Queensland and Australian Governments to 
improve the health of the GBR including: the updating of the Reef Water Quality Plan in 
2009 and 2013; the development of the 2050 Long Term Plan; the release of the 2015 
Baseline Investment Report and an increased commitment to increasing the funds necessary 
to stop pollution levels. Recent amendments to the Queensland environmental law also 
suggest the health of the GBR is being taken more seriously.
192
 There is also an extensive 
body of scientific work being done on the environmental impacts on the reef.
193
 A levy on the 
sugarcane industry to fund research bodies like Sugar Research Australia also provides some 
evidence of industry internalisation and commitment to reducing run-off. 
 
Despite all of this, however, there is only a partial and very limited implementation of the 
PPP. The majority of funds and ‘internalisation’ of costs are coming from the public sector 
through a variety of Queensland and Australian agencies. Whilst we acknowledge that some 
limited and targeted public funds are generally acceptable if they seek to develop new 
technologies and encourage abatement behaviour, we were unable to conclude that such funds 
were appropriately targeted. For instance, the total Queensland Government spending on 
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initiatives like the Reef Plan are not appropriately tracked nor reported and therefore ‘there is 
uncertainty as to how much is actually spent each year.’194  
 
The extent of implementation of the PPP is therefore uncertain. Our conclusions about partial 
implementation might be refined or challenged by further research. For instance, by 
calculating the economic costs of sugarcane pollution affecting the GBR and analysing what 
proportion of these costs are being borne by individual farmers and by the industry as a whole. 
In order to move towards a fuller implementation of the PPP in our case study, an accurate 
costing of the impacts the cane industry is having on water quality in the GBR needs to be 
completed. In the last decade, some preliminary analysis has been attempted by the scientific 
community,
195
 as well as more recently, by the Queensland Government.
196
 However, the 
Queensland Government itself recognises that there has been ‘limited economic work carried 
out linking practice change to environmental and social issues in the GBR catchment.’197 
Moreover, there are very few studies ‘that undertake economic analyses of the cost to change 
individual practices and how this affects the farm business at both an operational and 
economic level.’198 Once this analysis is undertaken, we might be able to more easily identify 
the amounts polluters were required to pay to reverse or remediate the environmental damage. 
 
Recommendations: improving the effectiveness of the law 
Based on the results above, we have suggested some strategies for improving the 
implementation of the principle in law and thus improving the effectiveness of the law. There 
are of course many other aspects of governance relevant to the issue of sugarcane pollution 
which we haven’t surveyed in depth in this report (access to information and public 
participation, enforcement and monitoring, adequacy of scientific research etc). Those aspects 
of governance would also need to be properly investigated and where needed improved. 
Defining the PPP in an effective national strategy  
It is widely acknowledged that the PPP, like other principles of environmental law is 
ambiguous and defining its ambit is difficult. Despite significant academic commentary, the 
PPP continues to be poorly defined at a legal level
199
 and thus poorly implemented in practice. 
Our research in this project suggests the position in Australia is no exception. However, the 
importance of being clear about the objectives of the principle and in what circumstances it 
ought to apply cannot be overstated. As Joseph makes clear, the application of the PPP has 
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very real implications from a policy perspective as it addresses ‘the fundamental question of 
who should pay for remediation of environmental damage – the polluters or the taxpayers.’200 
Likewise, Grossman comments: ‘consideration of the polluter pays principle and agriculture 
is timely, important, and widely relevant.”201  
 
Although the PPP may not require an ‘element-by-element’ deconstruction (as we attempted 
in Annexure C) if the principle is to be effectively implemented in Australian law, a clear 
statement must at least be provided. We suggest this might occur at two levels: First, what its 
objectives are, and second, in what circumstances it should (or could) be applied. We note 
that the ‘current’ 1992 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment and the National 
Strategy on ESD - which together are intended to guide all environmental policy-making in 
Australia – are significantly out-of-date. There is no evidence that they have ever been 
enforced. Moreover, their definition of the PPP (not to mention other principles of ESD) is 
loose and open to varying interpretations. Its objectives are unclear and it is not apparent in 
what circumstances it could (or should apply). We therefore suggest that a fresh, principled-
based national strategy for environmental governance in Australia is required, one which 
doesn’t simply make vague reference to principles like the PPP, but provides objectives for 
their implementation and a guide as to their effective implementation in particular instances. 
Such guidance could come from the international community where the PPP is best 
formulated and understood. We note that the IUCN has provided such guidance for the 
Precautionary Principle for instance.
202
  
 
Elevating the status of the PPP to a principle in its own right  
In Australia, the PPP is considered part of the principle of ‘improved valuation and pricing 
mechanisms.’ This broader principle is poorly defined at a national and state level, although 
there have been a limited attempt to define what it means and set out its objectives. It seems 
to generally reflect a commitment to valuing the environment as an asset and implementing 
‘cost effective’ mechanisms to improve environmental outcomes. The literature on the PPP 
doesn’t suggest it is primarily a mechanism for improved valuation and pricing. Rather, it 
appears to be a far broader principle which is able to stand on it’s on with a largely deterrent 
focus. It may for instance be implemented through market-based mechanisms or strict 
regulation, but neither is mandatory. The overall objective seems to be that polluters should 
be paying for their pollution, regardless of how that is made to occur. One suggestion 
therefore to increase the effectiveness of the PPP is to elevate it to the status of its own 
principle within the framework of ESD in Australia. Entire regulatory regimes could be built 
largely on the basis of the PPP, for instance; emissions trading and other carbon pollution 
reduction schemes, contaminated land regulations and clean up provisions, monitoring, 
enforcement and prosecution provisions and so on. The underlying strength of the principle - 
as a justification for deterring polluting behaviour – has yet to be fully realised in Australia. It 
may have in fact been lost in Australia by focusing on ‘improved pricing mechanisms’ rather 
than the substantive merits of what the principle is actually trying to do – stop pollution. 
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Improving the EPBC Act 
The EPBC Act is the main law which seeks to protect Australia’s national heritage. It does 
make indirect reference to the PPP, however, only indirectly in the objects of the legislation. 
The principles of ESD, and thus the PPP, are to be considered by the Minister when 
approving actions under the Act. However, currently, the run-off from sugarcane is not 
‘caught’ by the EPBC Act. If regulation is the best approach to resolving this issue (or at least 
a part of an effective response) then the cumulative impacts from agricultural pollution will 
need to be explicitly recognised by the EPBC Act. The extra level of oversight the EPBC Act 
would provide would apply additional pressure on industry and the Queensland Government 
to resolve this issue before any further irreversible damage is done to the health of the GBR. 
Improving Queensland law 
As made clear in this report, the Queensland government has already passed laws that more or 
less reflect the PPP in relation to run-off from sugar cane.
203
 These laws are strict (with fines 
up to $35,000 for non-compliance) but are currently not being enforced.
204
 The approach of 
the Queensland Government has been, on the advice of industry, to encourage voluntary 
abatement measures whilst maintaining crop yields. There is an argument that these voluntary 
initiatives, though whilst politically palatable, have been ineffective in stemming the flow of 
pollution into the reef: 
 
‘The policies and practices [the Australian government] adopt[s] aren’t doing what’s 
needed to improve water quality at the catchment level. Most interventionist 
measures now appear to be justified, including levying penalties on farmers when 
pollution loads exceed agreed targets and employing direct regulation.’205 
 
The Queensland Audit Office also questions the effectiveness of the voluntary programs 
citing low take up from cane farmers.
206
 Strict regulation of agricultural activities seemed at 
the time (2009) to be consistent with a general tendency worldwide to make agricultural 
polluters pay more for their emissions. As Grossman remarked in 2007, nations around the 
world had begun to recognize the serious air and water emissions that agriculture had 
caused.
207
 In many ways, regulation appears to be the most straightforward way of 
implementing the PPP. Unsurprisingly, regulation is unpopular with industry which has over 
the last few years campaigned to remove the 2009 regulations (or at the very least keep them 
idle) in order to “hand back control of the industry to the industry.”208  
 
Another suggested response is to improve the accountability and coordination of current 
governance programs. The Queensland Audit Office recently made clear in relation to this 
issue that ‘there is no strong accountability for the program expenditures that have been 
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attributed to achieving the Reef Plan goal and target.’209 Several agencies currently rely on 
estimates to report Reef Plan expenditure. Moreover, programs both public and private in 
nature, appear not to be complimentary or well-coordinated. The cane industry’s push back 
on NGO governance initiatives like Project Catalyst reflects conflicting governance goals and 
differing approaches to management between the various stakeholders. This may require, as 
the Queensland Audit Office suggests, the establishment of a single Queensland public sector 
body to be ‘accountable for overall coordination, management and evaluation of the 
numerous programs attributed to the Reef Plan.
210
 The recent establishment of an Office of the 
Great Barrier Reef with the Queensland Government may address this issue.
211
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Annexure A - Analysing the behaviour of Key Stakeholders  
 
NB: Some of the main stakeholder and some of their behaviours are analysed below. This does not include an extensive analysis of all stakeholders or all 
behaviours; however it does provide a starting point for further research and discussion. Other relevant bodies not included here might comprise: the Australian 
Sugar Milling Council, the Australian Society of Sugar Cane Technologists, the Australian Cane Farmers Association, the Australian Sugar Industry Alliance, 
and Queensland Sugar Limited. Although these bodies are not directly associated with environmental management within the industry, we might expect, at the 
very least, to see some environmental objectives that go towards acknowledging the issue of reef-off. A fuller analysis might investigate their actions. 
 
Sector Stakeholder About What behaviour would we 
expect? 
What behaviour are we seeing? 
Government  Australian 
Department of 
Environment 
(Doe) 
DoE is responsible for 
the protection of 
Australia’s national 
environment including 
its nationally listed 
species, migratory 
species, internationally 
renowned wetlands and 
World Heritage areas 
such as the GBR 
region.  
We would expect the DoE to be 
at the forefront of establishment 
of policies and programs, 
including regulation, designed 
to ensure sugarcane farmers 
begin to internalise the costs of 
their impacts on water quality. 
In recent times we have started to see DoE doing these things. 
The Department has, for example, collaborated with GBRMPA 
and Queensland Government to develop the 2050 Long Term 
Sustainability Plan.
212
 The plan has a target that by 2018, 90 per 
cent of sugarcane lands in the priority areas are to be managed 
using voluntary best management practice systems (BMPs).
213
 
This will require a significant shift in the practice of chemical use, 
recent reports suggests there is a long way to go in this regard.
214
 
The bigger question, however, in terms of implementing the PPP, 
is how will this commitment will be paid for? At the moment, 
Queensland and Australian Governments are funding the BMPs 
and other initiatives. A strict version of the PPP would not accept 
this. We might expect them in the future to further develop their 
plans, allocate funds, establish advisory committees and 
collaborate with other actors (both state and non-state) to 
implement these policies. 
Australian 
Great Barrier 
Reef Marine 
GBRMPA is an 
independent authority 
established to provide 
As an expert body charged with 
looking after the Marine Park, 
we would expect GBRMPA to 
Although managing the water entering the reef is not part of 
GBRMPA’s jurisdiction (on land activities are matters for DoE 
and EHP and DAF) GBRMPA has been active in addressing 
                                                        
212 Australian Government, Reef 2050 Long-Term Sustainability Plan <www.environment.gov.au/marine/gbr/publications/reef-2050-long-term-sustainability-plan> 
213 Australian Government, Reef 2050 Long-Term Sustainability Plan <www.environment.gov.au/marine/gbr/publications/reef-2050-long-term-sustainability-plan> 43 
214 Queensland Audit Office, Report 20, 2014-15 <available at www.qao.qld.gov.au>. 
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Sector Stakeholder About What behaviour would we 
expect? 
What behaviour are we seeing? 
Park Authority 
(GBRMPA) 
management, technical 
and scientific advice to 
the Australian 
Government about the 
GBR. 
provide high quality and 
independent expert advice and 
assistance on improving water 
quality from sugar cane farming 
in the key catchments.  
issues of water quality entering the GBR including:  
 Partnering with the Australian and Queensland government's 
under the Reef Water Quality Protection Plan. 
 Managing the Reef Rescue Marine Monitoring Program 
which monitors the marine ecosystems and the condition of 
water quality. 
 Preparing Water Quality Guidelines which identify 'trigger' 
levels. 
 
Queensland 
Department of 
Environment 
and Heritage 
Protection 
(EHP) 
EHP is the department 
responsible for 
protection of 
Queensland’s 
environment including 
pollution caused by 
agricultural run-off. 
Along with DoE be at the 
forefront of establishing policies 
and programs that help farmers 
to internalise the costs of their 
pollution. We might also expect 
a range of measures to ensure 
this occurs, from passing laws 
and tightening polices to the 
introduction of voluntary 
programs and incentives to 
encourage farmers to internalise 
costs of reducing pesticide use.  
The Queensland Government has started to act more consistently 
with what we might expect if the PPP was being implemented. 
For example, in recent years they committed to restricted 
conditions of use for particular chemical products on farming 
lands including: “reduced application rates and a ban on 
application if heavy rains are forecast and in areas susceptible to 
runoff.”215 They also recently passed laws which regulate sugar 
cane growers in the areas of the GBR most at risk from run-off. 
These laws set strict standards for cane (and cattle) farmers and 
were passed in 2009. These laws do represent an attempt to 
implement the PPP by requiring cane farmers (of over 70 
hectares) to meet certain standards for nitrogen and phosphorous 
use including reporting and preparing an approved environmental 
management plan. However, these regulations are not currently 
being enforced by EHP.
216
 Instead, the Queensland Government 
has focussed on voluntary best management practices (BMPs) 
schemes to ‘encourage’ the sugarcane industry to improve its 
performance. Unfortunately, monitoring of water quality does not 
appear to be sufficient.
217
 There are also problems with the design 
                                                        
215 Juliette King, Frances Alexander and Jon Brodie, ‘Regulation of pesticides in Australia: The Great Barrier Reef as a case study for evaluating effectiveness’ (2013) 180 
Agriculture, Ecosystems and Environment 54– 67, 58. 
216 Queensland Audit Office, Report 20, 2014-15 <available at www.qao.qld.gov.au> 10. 
217 Queensland Audit Office, Report 20, 2014-15 <available at www.qao.qld.gov.au> 2. 
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Sector Stakeholder About What behaviour would we 
expect? 
What behaviour are we seeing? 
of the BMPs themselves: “Results indicate that the right balance 
has not been achieved between industry-led, voluntary 
approaches and regulatory enforcement. The limitations that 
result from the missing rigour in overall program design are 
evident in the lack of clear, appropriate incentives and 
disincentives in the design of these voluntary Best Management 
Practice (BMP) programs.”218 
 
Queensland 
Department of 
Agriculture 
and Fisheries 
(DAF) 
DAF has responsibility 
for regulating 
Queensland’s 
agricultural and 
fisheries industries (but 
not necessarily 
environmental 
impacts).  
Supporting EHP and other 
Government Agencies in 
improving run-off issues from 
sugarcane. Working with 
farmers to transition to more 
sustainable industry practices.  
DAF has provided up to $4 million in funding towards cane and 
grazing industries. These are labelled as ‘extension services’ 
although it is not exactly clear what it involved or to what extent 
cane farmers were asked to co-contribute.
219
 DAF has also 
developed a ‘farm economic analysis tool’ (FEAT) for sugarcane 
farmers described as ‘a planning and decision-making tool 
developed to assist cane farming enterprises. The main reason to 
use FEAT is to gauge the economic impact of changing from one 
farming system to another.’220 It is not clear whether this is aimed 
specifically at improving run-off issues or if it is aimed at 
improving sugarcane yield (or both). 
Industry Farmers The Australian 
Sugarcane industry is 
located along the east 
coast of Australia from 
Grafton in Northern 
NSW to Mossman in 
far north 
Queensland.
221
  
Be the primary stakeholder 
recognising and beginning to 
internalise the costs of resolving 
the run-off issue in the GBR. 
We might expect to see this, 
eventually, being evidenced in 
their financial documents as a 
‘cost’, for instance, the purchase 
There is an acceptance of many farmers about the impacts their 
farming has had on the reef and a genuine willingness to improve 
water quality.
222
 Without access to the financial records of a large 
number of the farmers it is not possible to definitively determine 
whether the external cost associated with the run-off are being 
internalised. As an observation there appears to be little evidence 
that significant costs are being internalised, but instead, the costs 
are still largely on the shoulders of the public. Water quality 
                                                        
218 Queensland Audit Office, Report 20, 2014-15 <available at www.qao.qld.gov.au>. 
219 Australian Government and Queensland Government Reef 2050 Plan – Investment Baseline (June 2015) 23. 
220 Queensland Government, Department of Agriculture and Fisheries ‘Farm Economic Analysis Tool <https://www.daf.qld.gov.au/plants/field-crops-and-pastures/sugar/farm-
economic-analysis-tool> accessed 31 July 2015. 
221 Within that space there are 4200 cane farming entities, on 38,000 hectares of land. Whilst 95% of the operations are in Queensland, it is unclear how many precisely are in the 
relevant catchment areas. The majority of farmers are sole operators or family owned businesses. 
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Sector Stakeholder About What behaviour would we 
expect? 
What behaviour are we seeing? 
of new equipment or 
technologies to increase yield 
without excessive fertiliser or 
herbicide loads. 
monitoring does take place in some instances at paddock scale or 
sub catchment scale. Over 50% of sugar cane farmers, for 
instance, in the Mackay-Whitsundays catchment have adopted 
improved management practice.
223
 We are beginning to see some 
behaviours consistent with internalisation, although there are so 
many farmers and programs that a clear conclusion is difficult to 
draw.
224
 We can only speculate that some farmers are voluntarily 
acting consistently with an implementation of the PPP, whilst are 
not. 
Canegrowers 
Association 
(Canegrowers) 
Canegrowers are the 
‘peak group for 
sugarcane growers’, 
and are a lobby, 
representation and 
services group.  
As industry groups we might 
expect to see them identifying 
and acknowledging run-off into 
the reef as a problem that needs 
the attention of the industry as a 
whole; working with researchers 
to identify ways that the 
problem can be solved for 
example drafting guidelines. 
Canegrowers has developed the BMP for the Industry that 
includes the objective of providing the industry with guidelines 
for sustainable management of riparian lands and wetlands 
associated with sugarcane production and promote to landholders 
the benefits of adoption of the BMP in protecting and enhancing 
wetland biodiversity, fishery production and water quality. The 
document itself though does little to suggest methods of reducing 
reef run-off and has been criticised for focussing mainly on 
increased yields.
225
 Canegrowers has been critical of regulation 
and encouraged voluntary abatement. It has however funded 
bodies like Sugar Research Australia (see below) to undertake 
research into this difficult issue. They have also pushed back on 
initiatives from other stakeholders like Project Catalyst an 
initiative of WWF and Coca Cola. See the main part of the report. 
Their allegiance is clearly (and unsurprisingly) with the industry 
and increasing yields. We might expect them in the future to take 
a stronger position on reef run-off issues (as opposed to yield) if 
the PPP were to be effectively implemented. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
222 Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, ‘Water Quality in the GBR’ Youtube video- http://www.gbrmpa.gov.au/managing-the-reef/how-the-reefs-managed/water-quality-in-
the-great-barrier-reef accessed 31 July 2015. 
223 Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority, ‘Water Quality in the GBR’ Youtube video- http://www.gbrmpa.gov.au/managing-the-reef/how-the-reefs-managed/water-quality-in-
the-great-barrier-reef accessed 31 July 2015. 
224 Queensland Audit Office, Report 20, 2014-15 <available at www.qao.qld.gov.au>. 
225 Queensland Audit Office, Report 20, 2014-15 <available at www.qao.qld.gov.au>. 
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Sector Stakeholder About What behaviour would we 
expect? 
What behaviour are we seeing? 
Sugar 
Research 
Australia 
(SRA) 
A research body 
funded by a statutory 
levy paid by growers 
and millers, SRA 
manages research and 
development projects 
that focus on 
productivity, 
profitability and 
sustainability of the 
industry. 
As above. SRA has not only acknowledged the problem but is actively 
working on research to find viable solutions. Their research is 
funded by a statutory levy – ‘70 cents per tonne of cane, with both 
grower and milling businesses each contributing 35 cents per 
tonne of cane. The statutory levy came into force on 1 July 
2013.’226 However, the SRA member and levy payers' stakeholder 
investment is ‘also directly supported by the Australian 
Government matching funds and grants from the Queensland 
Government and other bodies.’227Queensland Government 
support for Sugar Research Australia ($16 million from 2012 to 
2015) is addressing industry research priorities, some of which 
will have benefits for Reef water quality.
228
 In 2014, the health of 
the reef and nutrient management was one of the main research 
projects allocated funding. The results of that project are yet to be 
released. As part of that project they are also currently 
investigating viable alternatives too herbicides. They have also 
funded important research by university including: Quantification 
of effects of cane field drainage on stream ecology and: Water 
quality and unexplained fish kills in sugarcane districts of 
northern Queensland.
229
  
NGO WWF-
Australia 
(WWF)  
WWF is the Australian 
arm of one of the 
world’s largest and 
most respected 
Taking an active role in 
campaigning and encouraging 
better practices around run-off 
and on the ground work to 
For several years, WWF have worked directly with sugarcane 
farmers to improve water quality in the priority catchment areas. 
They have been involved in a variety of projects from funding 
research
230
 to engaging with international institutions on the 
                                                        
226 Sugar Research Australia, ‘Statutory Levy’ <http://www.sugarresearch.com.au/page/About_SRA/Statutory_levy/> accessed 31 July 2015. 
227 Sugar Research Australia, ‘About SRA’ <http://www.sugarresearch.com.au/page/About_SRA/Introducing_SRA/> accessed 31 July 2015. 
228 Queensland Government ‘News: a new Reef Plan achievements report’ http://www.reefplan.qld.gov.au/resources/news/ accessed 31 July 2015. 
229 R Pearson, M Crossland, B Butler and S Manwaring, ‘Water quality and unexplained fish kills in sugarcane districts of northern Queensland’ ACTFR Report No. 03/03 
available at <https://research.jcu.edu.au> 
230 Jim Binney and Dr Chris Fleming, ‘Realising the Reef Trust - concepts, options and opportunities: A report for World Wildlife Fund International, the Australian Marine 
Conservation Society, and Griffith University’ (2014) available at https://www.griffith.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/601535/Reef-Trust-FINAL.pdf. 
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Sector Stakeholder About What behaviour would we 
expect? 
What behaviour are we seeing? 
environmental NGOs. 
They campaign and 
fund initiatives which 
seek to protect 
biodiversity and 
ecological values. 
improve reef run-off. health and governance of the GBR such as the IUCN and the 
UNESCO World Heritage Committee.
231
 They have also played 
an important role in educating the public through simple videos 
and statements designed to raise the profile of the issue of run-off 
and what is being done to combat it. Their collaboration with 
farmers, government and other industry groups is consistent with 
what we might expect from an NGO for an effective 
implementation of the PPP. 
Terrain  Terrain is a community 
based NGO working to 
protect the natural 
environmental 
resources in the Wet 
Tropics region.  
 
An active role in implementing 
water quality initiatives in the 
Wet Tropics Region and 
encouraging farmers to work 
with government and NGOs to 
reduce pollution. 
We are seeing evidence of this. Terrain runs various programs 
with farmers to improve water quality in the Wet Tropics. They 
are managing for instance a grant system to encourage farmers to 
improve their land use in the region. They are also working with 
WWF and Coca Cola in the Project Catalyst endeavour as well as 
the Paddock to Reef programme.
232
 Like WWF, this ‘on the 
ground’ work is more or less consistent with what we would 
expect from an NGO – assisting with longer term change to 
resolve the issue. 
 
  
                                                        
231 WWF ‘Report to UNESCO World Heritage Committee <http://www.wwf.org.au/?8921/Report-to-the-UNESCO-World-Heritage-Committee>. 
232 Terrain, ‘Project Catalyst’ <http://www.terrain.org.au/Projects/Innovation-in-Agriculture/Project-Catalyst> accessed 31 July 2015. 
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Annexure B - Suggested elements of the PPP 
 
 
  
                                                        
233 J Waterhouse, J Brodie, S Lewis, A Mitchell, ‘The Catchment to Reef Continuum: Case studies from the Great Barrier Reef’ (2012) 65 Marine Pollution Bulletin 296. 
 Element Explanation 
1. There should be some form of 
‘pollution’ which has occurred (or may 
occur – see below element 4.) which can 
be quantified in economic terms. 
We have adopted broad definition of pollution in this research: ‘a concentration/load of material that is elevated above 
natural levels that are known to cause environmental harm.’233 The requirement for the pollution to be able to be 
quantified in economic terms reflects the origin of the PPP in economic theory and the need to ensure reasonable costs 
can be attributed to the polluter (see element 4.)  
2. There must be someone who can be 
identified as the ‘polluter’. 
The polluter should be a legal entity that is a person, a corporation, a government, council or other institution. The entity 
must be capable of holding accounts, paying debts, being sued, running an operation etc. It is important they have legal 
personality such that the requirement for them to ‘pay’ can be enforced in a Court of law. 
3. The polluter(s) must be solely, or at least 
substantially, responsible for causing the 
pollution. 
There may be many actors involved in a complex chain of events that leads to pollution. Contractors, agents, subsidiary 
companies etc. acting under the guidance of the real ‘polluter’ means that linking the polluter to the pollution may prove 
difficult. Nevertheless, there must be some significant causal connection between the polluter, their actions and the 
pollution caused in order to effectively internalise the costs of those actions. 
4. The polluter should be required to 
internalise all (or most) of the costs of 
pollution at some point in the chain of 
events leading to the pollution incident. 
The internalisation of costs can come before or after a pollution incident. This is consistent with the principle having 
both restorative and preventative functions. The payment of a bond, financial assurance, offset, or other levy may be 
sufficient in this regard, depending on the amount and its purpose. The requirement for ‘most’ of the costs is consistent 
with our view that some reasonable and well-targeted state support for industry is acceptable. 
5. The amount the polluter is required to 
pay should represent a significant 
portion of the cost of remediating (or 
preventing damage to) the environment, 
and may also include any flow on effects 
to society. 
For pollution costs to be fully internalised, it would need to be costed in dollar terms. According to the principle of 
proportionality, polluters should be required to pay an amount relevant to their costed contribution. Quantifying 
pollution costs are likely to be complicated and would require further validation (see Step 5 of the method). In addition, 
we acknowledge that there is still some ambiguity about whether full internalisation of costs should occur. The original 
formulation of the PPP was subject to the understanding of regulators with regard to ‘an acceptable state’ of the 
environment. Partial internalisation is therefore also seen to have some environmental and societal benefit. 
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Annexure C - Provisions of the EP Act consistent with the PPP 
 
Provision  Effect of provision Comment 
Sections 501 and 503 These provisions allow the 
prosecuting authority in Queensland to 
be reimbursed for costs reasonably 
incurred in prosecuting the polluter for 
a breach of the EP Act. 
The availability of these provisions is in line with the PPP. It allows the state to recoup public 
expenses for private polluting activities. Interestingly, it also aligns with the principle of 
proportionality, which is closely linked to the PPP,
234
 insofar as only those costs which are 
‘reasonably incurred’, under the provision, by the state can be sought from the polluter. 
Section 502 Allows Courts to issue a variety of 
orders for a polluter including orders 
for rehabilitation, restoration, 
education, monetary and public 
benefit. 
The availability of these orders allows the Court to not only punish offenders but to recoup, in 
a variety of flexible ways, the damage done to communities and the environment through 
polluting activities. The availability of these orders are consistent with the PPP. 
Section 502A This section allows the prosecuting 
authority to carry out work and/or take 
action to recover costs where a 
polluter fails to comply with a section 
502 order. 
The availability of obtaining the costs of not only the pollution but of enforcement and 
compliance with the law seeks, at least in theory, to implement the PPP. 
Section 326A This provision allows the Queensland 
assessment authority to recover costs 
of an environmental audit or report 
reasonably incurred 
The recovery of assessment costs helps to internalize externalities of the pollution before it 
occurs. In this way, such a provision aligns with the principle of prevention (or the 
precautionary principle). The preventative function is an important aspect of the PPP.
235
  
 
NB: There are also several other provisions in the EP Act which allow the State to recover costs of administering the Act and preventing pollution including 
sections 271, 363N, 382, 419A and 489. In the end, the availability of all these provisions is largely irrelevant as the Queensland Government has decided not to 
enforce the EP Act against farmers but instead, focus on voluntary industry-led initiatives. Nevertheless, the EP Act does include numerous provisions consistent 
with application of the PPP, including the specific regulations in Chapter 4A aimed at sugarcane run-off. 
                                                        
234 The Queen v Secretary of State for the Environment, Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte H.A Standley and Others (1999) Case C-293/97. 51-52. 
235 Nicolas de Sadeleer, Environmental Principles: From Political Slogans to Legal Rules (Oxford University Press, 2002) 36. 
